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Abstract
The idea of a flat tax, a tax levied at a single rate, has become an increasingly discussed and
implemented fiscal strategy across Europe and the rest of the world. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
adopted flat tax systems in 1994 and 1995, making them the first modern countries to adopt flat tax
structures. They subsequently experienced unprecedented economic growth, shocking the world as they
emerged as “Baltic Tigers” at the turn of the century. Russia adopted a flat tax regime in 2001, and more
than a dozen countries currently maintain some sort of flat tax structure today. However, the actual effect
of the flat tax rate on the Baltic countries’ economic growth remains debated.
Though there is clearly timing a correlation between the Baltic States’ economic growth and the
implementation of the flat tax, the current economic analysis on the effect of the flat tax rate is largely
confined to Russia. Additional research and analysis needs to be completed before determining whether
the success of the “Baltic Tigers” can, and if so, to what extent, be attributed to their flat tax policies. The
Baltic States are an appropriate laboratory for a number of reasons: they have the longest history for
examination, and have many similarities between them including, economy, geographical location, and
relationship to Europe. These similarities allow the analysis to control for unique factors in the individual
countries and isolate the effect of a flat tax.
Looking at revenue, GDP, and labor supply data, this paper attempts to analyze the effect of the flat tax on
these three Baltic states. Using the analysis on these countries, this paper attempts to discuss whether a
flat tax rate is an effective and potent growth strategy for transitional economies. The findings of these
analyses do not indicate that the flat tax has any definitive positive impact on growth, equity, or labor
supply. However, without the simplicity of the flat tax such growth may not have been able to occur in the
early years of the Baltic states’ independence.
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Abstract
The idea of a flat tax, a tax levied at a single rate, has become an increasingly
discussed and implemented fiscal strategy across Europe and the rest of the world.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania adopted flat tax systems in 1994 and 1995, making them
the first modern countries to adopt flat tax structures. They subsequently experienced
unprecedented economic growth, shocking the world as they emerged as “Baltic Tigers”
at the turn of the century. Russia adopted a flat tax regime in 2001, and more than a
dozen countries currently maintain some sort of flat tax structure today. However, the
actual effect of the flat tax rate on the Baltic countries’ economic growth remains
debated.
Though there is clearly timing a correlation between the Baltic States’ economic
growth and the implementation of the flat tax, the current economic analysis on the effect
of the flat tax rate is largely confined to Russia. Additional research and analysis needs to
be completed before determining whether the success of the “Baltic Tigers” can, and if
so, to what extent, be attributed to their flat tax policies. The Baltic States are an
appropriate laboratory for a number of reasons: they have the longest history for
examination, and have many similarities between them including, economy, geographical
location, and relationship to Europe. These similarities allow the analysis to control for
unique factors in the individual countries and isolate the effect of a flat tax.
Looking at revenue, GDP, and labor supply data, this paper attempts to analyze
the effect of the flat tax on these three Baltic states. Using the analysis on these countries,
this paper attempts to discuss whether a flat tax rate is an effective and potent growth
strategy for transitional economies. The findings of these analyses do not indicate that the

flat tax has any definitive positive impact on growth, equity, or labor supply. However,
without the simplicity of the flat tax such growth may not have been able to occur in the
early years of the Baltic states’ independence.
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Introduction: Flat Taxes in the Baltic States
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period of transition and
privatization began across Eastern and Central Europe. During this time, fiscal strategy
was not at the forefront of policy discussions. Initially, all newly independent countries
inherited the tax system used by the Soviet Union.1 This Soviet style tax system included
turnover and enterprise profit taxes and was generally inefficient under the newly
liberalized and privatized economies.2 Thus, as these countries began to transition into a
market economy and a private sector emerged, the creation of new tax laws became
increasingly necessary.3
Beginning with Estonia’s flat tax reform, tax policies in transitional economies
began to receive increasing attention.4 Estonia adopted a flat tax rate in 1994, followed by
Lithuania in 1994 and Latvia in 1995.5 Since the Baltic states’ adoption, other Central
and Eastern European countries have followed, including the Russian Federation in 2001,
the Slovak Republic and Ukraine in 2004, and Georgia and Romania in 2005.6 The
publicity from the flat tax reforms has generated debate in other transitional economies
including Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic.7
The flat taxes of the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—do not follow
the exact model laid out by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka or Steve Forbes in the works

1

Emil, et al., Tax Reform in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union.
Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 1999, p. 1.
2
Stepanyan, Vahram, “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of
the Former Soviet Union.” Washington DC: International Monteary Fund, 2003, p. 12.
3
Emil, et al., p. 1.
4
Saavedra, Pablo, “Flat Income Tax Reforms,” Washington DC: The World Bank, 2007, p. 254.
5
Ibid, p. 256.
6
Ibid, p. 255.
7
Ibid, p. 253.
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The Flat Tax8 and Flat Tax Revolution.9 A pure flat tax system has not yet been
integrated in any country thus far,10 and the idea of a “flat tax” has come to be used much
more loosely than the Hall and Rabushka sense. Today it generally refers only to a single
marginal tax rate11 on income earned.12 The primary difference between the theoretical
Hall and Rabushka flat tax and the current structure in the Baltic states is that in addition
to a personal income and corporate tax rate, all three countries continue to have valueadded taxes (VAT), whose rates vary between 5 and 18 percent. Additionally, the reforms
introduced tax-free allowances or deductions which add some progressive elements to the
system.13 The allowance is generally a minimum income below which individuals are not
taxed.14 The flat tax countries have also introduced social contributions,15 which account
for a significant part of revenue.16 However, the three countries are still considered to be
flat tax regimes because they operate predominantly single tax systems under which
nearly every citizen, regardless of income earned, pays the same marginal tax rate.17

8

Hall, Robert E. and Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2007.
Forbes, Steve. Flat Tax Revolution:Using a Postcard to Abolish the IRS. Washington, D.C: Regnery
Publishing, Inc. 2005.
10
Ministry of Finance, Czech Republic. “Macroeconomic Outlook: Fiscal Outlook: Topic 4, Flat tax in
Practice.” Czech Republic: 2009.
11
Marginal tax rate refers to marginal tax rate is the tax rate that applies to the taxpayer’s last dollar of
taxable income. (http://www.fairtax.org/PDF/WhatIsTheDifferenceBetweenTaxRates.pdf)
12
Keen, Michael; Kim, Yitae, and Ricardo Varsano. “The ‘Flat Tax(es)’: Principles and Evidence.” IMF
Working Paper No. 06/218. International Monetary Fund, September 2006, p. 714.
13
Saavedra, p. 258.
14
Ibid, p. 258.
15
Social contributions include social security contributions by employees, employers, and self-employed
individuals, as well as other contributions to social insurance schemes operated by governments
(nationmaster.com).
16
Keen, p. 714.
17
Murphy, Richard. “A Flat Tax for the UK? The Implications of Simplification.” ACCA, p. 21.
9
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Table 1. Current flat taxes (rates in percent)
Personal income tax rates
Country
Estonia

Flat tax
adopted

Before(a)

After(a)

1994

16-33

26

22(b)
(d)

Corporate income tax rate
Before(a)

2007

After(a)

2007

35

26

22(c)

Modest increase

Basic allowance

Lithuania

1994

18-33

33

27

29

29

15

Substantial increase

Latvia

1997

25 and 10

25

25

25

25

15

Slight reduction

Russia

2001

12-30

13

13

30

35

24

Modest increase

(e)

Ukraine

2004

10-40

13

15

30

25

25

Increase

Slovak Rep.

2004

10-38

19

19

25

19

19

Substantial increase

Georia

2005

12-20

12

12

20

20

20

Eliminated

Romania

2005

18-40

16

16

25

16

16

Increase

(a) Rates relate to year before and after adoption of the flat tax
(b) Rate reductions planned, to 20% in 2009, 19% in 2010, and 18% from 2011
(c) Tax on distributed profits only since 2000. Rate planned to be reduced in step with the personal income tax rate
(d) Rate planned to be 24% from 2008
(e) Rate reductions planned, to 22% in 2010 and 20% in 2012 are planned
Source: Keen et al., 716

Table 2. Tax Structures in the Baltic Countries
Savings
Taxed

Pensions
Taxed

Oversees
Earnings
Taxed

Capital
Gains
Taxed

Inheritence
Tax

Other Tax
Deductions
and Reliefs

Estonia



Mainly



Mainly

X

X

Latvia
Lithuania




Some
X








X




Country

Source: Murphy, Richard. “A Flat Tax for the UK? The Implications of Simplification.” ACCA, p. 22.

Looking at these tax rates, Alvin Rabushka, co-author of The Flat Tax, noted that “all of
these countries are flat tax regimes in the sense that there’s only one marginal rate of tax
above the threshold. None of them meet 100% of the criterion of the [Hall and Rabushka
framework]… but in every case they are better than what they replaced.”18 In each
country, the new tax system, while not entirely flat, created a less progressive tax scheme
than the one it followed.
18

ACCA, p. 23. The Baltic countries, like other transitional economies, inherited a Soviet style tax system,
which included turnover and enterprise profit taxes. These did not operate efficiently under privatization.
(Stepanyan, p.12) In almost all transitional economies, the tax reform included the abolishment of the
enterprise profit and turnover taxes and the introduction of a personal income tax, enterprise tax, and a
value added tax. (Stepanyan, p.12)
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While prior to the flat tax implementation all three states were suffering from
inefficiency and economic stagnation,19 the three experienced unprecedented growth
following the tax reform. When Estonia’s prime minister Mart Laar established a 26
percent flat tax on business and personal income in 1994, Estonia’s economy was
contracting.20 With the flat tax, Estonia established personal exemptions of about $1000 a
year.21 The tax rate has since been reduced to 22 percent, and is scheduled to be reduced
to 18 percent by 2011.22 Since the implementation of the tax reforms, Estonia has
experienced an average growth of 9 percent each year after adjusting for inflation.23 With
a population of 1.4 million people, it attracted $890 million in foreign direct investment
in 2003 and $926 million in 2004, more than 10 times what China, with a population of
more than 1.2 billion, received.24
Lithuania and Latvia also experienced tremendous turnaround following the
establishment of their flat tax rates. Lithuania emerged as the fastest growing economy in
the Baltics, with a 6.7 percent growth rate in 2002, 9 percent in 2003, and 8 percent in
2004.25 Latvia has experienced an average growth rate of about 4 percent a year since the
flat tax, and its inflation, which was 25 percent in 1995 was down to less than 4 percent
by 2003.26
However, controversy remains as to whether or not the success of the Baltic
Tigers can be attributed to the flat tax system, as well as about the effectiveness of flat

19

Shen, Raphael. Restructuring the Baltic Economies: Disengaging Fifty Years of Integration with the
USSR. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994, p. 1.
20
Forbes, p. 97.
21
Ibid. p. 96.
22
Mitchell, Daniel J. “Baltic Beacon.” Wall Street Journal Europe. June 20, 2007.
23
Ibid.
24
Forbes, p. 97; cia.gov.
25
Ibid. p. 98.
26
Forbes, p. 98.
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taxes in general. Some scholars and policy makers point to the success in the Baltic
countries as evidence for a flat tax’s success. In a 2006 IMF paper and in subsequent
discussions, Michael Keen argues that the effect of the flat tax is generally ambiguous.
He poses the question not as “whether more countries will adopt a flat tax,” but “as
whether those that have it will move away from it.”27 Yet, in a 2007 article for The Wall
Street Journal Europe, the CATO institute’s Daniel Mitchell pointed to Estonia’s success
with a flat tax, arguing that “the flat tax has helped Estonia become one of the world’s
fastest growing economies.” Mitchell claims that the lower tax rates and greater
simplicity have led to a Laffer Curve effect, where tax revenues almost doubled since
2000, and corporate tax receipts increased by more than three times.28
Although the flat tax has received much attention in the news and political
discussions, there has been little analysis examining its effects. There is copious
economic literature analyzing the effects of tax changes, yet few studies, either
theoretical or empirical, on the flat tax. Except for Russia and the Slovak Republic, and
more recently Estonia,29 there appears to be no household level analyses looking at the
effect of the flat tax. Michael Keen noted that there “is an evident need for studies in
other flat tax countries along similar lines, and for work, too on the impact of the flat
tax…”30
Understanding the actual effect of the flat tax reforms in the Baltic states has
enormous payoff for the fiscal policy of other transitional economies and countries in

27

Keen, p. 712.
Mitchell
29
Staehr, Karsten. “Estimates of Employment and Welfare Effects of Personal Labour Income Taxation in
a Flat-Tax Country: The Case of Estonia.” Estonia: Bank of Estonia, 2008. A discussion of the analysis is
found in the Estonia chapter.
30
Keen, p. 741.
28
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general. After looking at its neighbors, Russia adopted a 13 percent flat tax in 2001 on
personal income, making it the first major economy to adopt a flat tax.31 Since then, more
than a dozen countries both within and outside the former Soviet Union have adopted flat
taxes.32 Debate ensues between research institutes, scholars, and those in government
throughout America and Europe about whether a flat tax is an appropriate fiscal policy.33
The Baltic states were the first to adopt a flat tax, and therefore have the most
years to examine in looking at its effect. They present three similarly sized countries with
similar economies and relationships to Europe that experienced unprecedented economic
growth following the implementation of a flat tax rate. Yet there remains little analysis on
these countries and the effect of their 1990s fiscal policy and any analysis generally
yields an inconclusive verdict. This is for several reasons including a lack of household
level analyses, the tax systems of the countries including some progressive features, and
the tax changes occurring during a precarious macroeconomic situation where many
reforms occurred simultaneously. By better understanding the effect of flat taxes in these
countries on their growth, policy makers can gain deeper insight on fiscal policy and
growth strategies in the former Soviet Union and transitional economies. This paper
analyzes the Baltic countries on an individual and aggregate level and discusses whether
a flat tax rate is an effective and potent growth strategy for transitional economies.

31

Ivanova, Anna; Keen, Michael, and Alexander Klemm. “The Russian Flat Tax Reform.” IMF Working
Paper, International Monetary Fund, January 2005. p. 2.
32
Forbes
33
Rabushka, Alvin. “The Flat Tax Gains Momentum.” Stanford: The Hoover Institute, August 3, 2004.
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Theory of a Flat Tax
The main architects of modern flat tax theory are Robert Hall, Alvin Rabushka,
and Steve Forbes. Hall and Rabushka, both of Stanford University and the Hoover
Institute, first proposed a flat tax in a 1981 Wall Street Journal article. In 1995, they
published their book, The Flat Tax. Steve Forbes, editor-in-chief of Forbes magazine and
president and chief executive officer of Forbes Inc. ran in the 1996 and 2000 United
States Republican presidential primaries with the flat tax serving as a focal point of his
campaign.34 In 2005, Forbes published a book, Flat Tax Revolution, in which he laid out
his arguments for a flat tax.
The underlying element of a flat tax is that a charge is levied at a uniform
percentage rate on all transactions liable to the tax. The flat tax can take a number of
forms, including a tax on all of one’s income levied at a single rate, a tax of a single rate
levied on some parts of one’s income, and a tax charged on purchases or consumption
within the economy. This single tax rate means there is a fixed marginal tax rate, not
necessarily a fixed average tax rate.35
The principle behind both Hall and Rabushka’s as well as Forbes’ flat tax
proposals is that people are taxed on their consumption, not on their investment or
savings. Their tax is levied at a fixed rate on some parts of people’s income. Both plans
propose doing this through a single income tax and a single corporate business tax.36 Hall
and Rabushka propose that both wage and business income is taxed at 19 percent,37 while

34

Forbes, p. xvii.
ACCA, p. 9. Marginal tax rate is the rate on the last segment of income earned. The average tax rate is
the ratio of the amount of taxes paid to taxable income. (Fairtax.org: What is the difference between
statutory, average, marginal, and effective tax rates?, p. 2).
36
Hall and Rabushka, p. 90; Forbes, pp. 60, 66.
37
Hall and Rabushka, p. 83.
35
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Forbes suggests that the federal income tax and a corporate tax be levied at 17 percent of
profits.38 Forbes also suggests generous exemptions for adults and children.39 Both
proposals eliminate deductions on interest payments40 as well as eliminating taxes on
dividends and interest payments.41 Additionally, both propose that only domestic
operations should be taxed.42
Hall and Rabushka explain that their tax proposal is in fact a consumption tax or
tax on spending, as income is taxed once, and investment and sales are not taxed.43
Therefore, by measuring consumption as income minus investment, citizens would be
taxed only on their consumption.44 Hall and Rabushka as well as Forbes agree that taxing
income is preferred to imposing a sales or value-added tax.45 Arguments for this
preference include that a sales tax would tax the poor, who would be exempt from an
income tax.46 Forbes also argues that a sales tax or VAT would raise the price of many
goods and services, devastate the housing market by increasing the price of houses, and
increase tax avoidance and evasion.47
The three primary advantages of a flat tax system, as Hall and Rabushka lay out,
are increased economic growth, simplicity, and equity. They argue that a flat tax, with a
single marginal tax rate, will provide increased incentives to work, thus increasing
entrepreneurial activity, capital formation, and national output.48 Hall and Rabushka also

38

Forbes, pp. 60, 66.
Forbes, p. 60.
40
Hall and Rabushka, p. 92; Forbes, p. 68.
41
Hall and Rabushka, p. 92; Forbes, p. 63.
42
Hall and Rabushka, p. 117; Forbes, p. 69.
43
Hall and Rabushka, pp. 63, 79, 81.
44
Ibid.. p. 83.
45
Hall and Rabushka, p. 81; Forbes, p. 80.
46
Hall and Rabushka, p. 81.
47
Forbes, p. 85.
48
Hall and Rabushka, p. 127.
39
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claim that under their flat tax system, interest rates, which are untaxed, will be lowered
since lenders will no longer be concerned about interest tax and borrowers, no longer
receiving deductions for interest paid, will be less inclined to borrow.49 They add that by
lowering the tax rate in a uniform income tax, there will be increased compliance and
decreased tax avoidance and evasion, thus generating increased tax revenues.50 Forbes
adds that the tax will incentivize more productive work and additional risk taking.51 The
additional investment from the flat tax should create wealth, and this creates additional
government revenue.52
Furthermore, both tax proposals set forth claim to be “postcard” tax reforms, with
the tax forms being able to fit on postcards, making tax payments significantly simpler.
Finally, as Hall and Rabushka argue, the flat tax is equitable as the taxpayer pays taxes in
direct proportion to his income, with those earning more, paying more.53 Additionally,
they claim, that by lowering taxes, the government allows increased individual liberty, as
higher taxes threaten individual freedom.54
Today, the main discussions surrounding a flat tax include the arguments that a
flat tax creates simplicity, increased administrative efficiency, as well as greater
incentives for investment, savings, and labor force participation through lower marginal
tax burdens.55 In theory, the less a tax rate alters someone’s economic behavior, the more
efficient it is. Therefore, a tax of the same rate across income levels should theoretically

49

Ibid. p.143.
Ibid. p. 44.
51
Forbes, p. 71.
52
Forbes, p. 71.
53
Hall and Rabushka, p. 41.
54
Hall and Rabushka, p. 43.
55
Saavedra, p. 254.
50
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alter one’s behavior less and create greater economic efficiency.56 Additionally,
proponents argue that flat taxes decrease tax arbitrage, in which tax liability is shifted
from high to low income groups.57
The idea behind taxation as it relates to labor is that on the supply side, it is
assumed that taxpayers adjust the labor supply they provide in response to taxation
changes. 58 As the tax rate rises, if there were no supply side response, government
revenue would continue to rise linearly, since higher taxes mean higher revenues.
However, the typical supply response causes labor supply to decrease with an increase in
tax rate, leading to what is known as the Laffer Effect: a peak and then decline of labor
supply as tax rates increase.59 Therefore, low tax rates and less progressive tax structures
may increase the labor supply, especially if it is elastic, particularly among higher income
individuals. However, flat tax rates can also reduce labor supply among lower income
individuals if these individuals are not exempted from at least some element of the tax.60
Equity also plays a part in the discussion surrounding the flat tax. While a main
argument and motivation for the flat tax has been to create growth and investment, the
main opposition has been that the flat tax is inequitable; under a flat tax system, taxpayers
on the same income level all pay the same taxes, the higher income individuals do not
bear a heavier burden proportionally than low income ones.61 Flat tax proponents argue,
however, that with the implementation of exemptions, which exempt the lowest level of

56

Ibid. p. 255.
Ibid, p. 255.
58
Stepanyan, Vahram. “Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of
the Former Soviet Union.” Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, 2003, p. 24.
59
Laffer, Arthur B. “The Laffer Curve: Past, Present, and Future.” Washington DC: The Heritage
Foundation, 2004
60
Saavedra, p. 255.
61
Saavedra, p. 255.
57
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income from paying taxes, and the removal of loopholes, of which the higher income
people are generally able to take greater advantage, a flat tax actually makes the tax
structure more equitable.62

62

Ibid, p. 255.

Deena Greenberg

Page 12

3/24/2009

Literature Review
The analytical literature on the effect of flat tax rates in the former Soviet Union
and transitional economies has been largely confined to studies on Russia, and it does not
agree on the effect of Russia’s flat tax. The existing literature analyzes whether an actual
role of the flat tax can be demonstrated in affecting Russia’s revenue growth or in
increasing compliance in tax payments in Russia.
In 2003, Sergei Sinelnikov-Mourylev, Said Batkibekov, P. Kadochnikov, and
Denis Nekipelov of the Institute for Economies in Transition published a paper
examining the effect of Russia’s 2000 reform to decrease the personal income tax rate.63
The authors look at the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and examine
whether the personal income tax (PIT) base increased more in areas that faced the
greatest reduction of marginal tax rate. The authors do find a significant effect, and
attribute about half of the tax revenue gain to the reduction in marginal tax rates.64
The first major work examining the effect of a flat tax rate, as opposed to only a
decrease in marginal tax rate, was published in 2005 by Anna Ivanova, Michael Keen,
and Alexander Klemm for the International Monetary Fund. The authors also look at the
RLMS throughout pre and post reform periods and build on the work of SinelnikovMurylev et al. by measuring the effect of the tax on revenue, compliance, and labor
supply using micro-level panel data.65 The authors looked at revenue performance across
levels of government.66 Although revenue from the personal income tax did increase by

63

Sinelnikov-Mourylev, Sergei; Batkibekov, Said; Kadochnikov, P., and Denis Nekipelov. “Assessment of
the Results of Personal Income Tax Reform in Russia.” Moscow: Institute for Economies in Transition,
2003.
64
Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm, p. 5.
65
Ibid. p. 5.
66
Ibid. p. 15.
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about 25 percent in real terms, revenue from all but three sources significantly increased
as well, suggesting an underlying cause beyond the change in personal income tax.67
They use a “differences in differences” methodology to compare individuals who are
affected by the reform with those relatively unaffected.68 However, they found no
evidence of a supply-side effect of the flat tax. In fact, they found that Russia received
lower tax revenues from those affected by the 2001 reform.69 The authors also found
labor supply changes to be the same for those affected and unaffected by tax reform.70
However, they did find that compliance increased by about one third, either due to the
reform itself or accompanying changes in enforcement.71
Following this 2005 IMF paper, Michael Keen, Yitae Kim, and Ricardo Varsano
published a paper for the IMF in 2006 examining the effect of the flat tax.72 Looking at
data from Russia and Slovakia,73 they find that there is no evidence of a Laffer-type
response, where revenue is generated as a result of a tax cut. They did find evidence that
compliance improved in Russia, although, they could not establish a direct link to tax
reform rather than changes in enforcement occurring around the same time.74 The authors
also did not find that the flat tax had a direct impact on work incentives. The one study
that looks at households’ responses to the flat tax examines Russia, and does not find a
significant impact on work produced.75

67

Ibid. pp. 15-16.
Ibid. p. 23.
69
Ibid. p. 39.
70
Ibid. p. 40.
71
Ibid. p. 1.
72
Keen, Michael; Kim, Yitae, and Ricardo Varsano. “The ‘Flat Tax(es)’: Principles and Evidence.” IMF
Working Paper No. 06/218. International Monetary Fund, September 2006.
73
Keen, Kim, and Varsano, p. 24.
74
Ibid. p. 36.
75
Ibid. p. 27.
68
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In 2008, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, and Klara Sabirianova
Peter for the National Bureau of Economic Research, published a paper examining the
effect of Russia’s flat tax reform on tax evasion and worker productivity.76 The authors
also use the 1998 and 2000-2004 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey.
Their approach to evaluating compliance is to examine differences between reported
consumption and reported income.77 The authors also develop a framework to assess
deadweight loss from the PIT where there is tax evasion.78
While Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm’s paper does not separate the effects of
improved voluntary tax compliance and improved enforcement, the NBER paper
attempts to do so. They find that tax evasion was reduced most among those who
experienced the largest decrease in tax rates.79 However, they find that there is no effect
of tax enforcement policies on compliance and that instead the flat tax reform played a
significant role in decreasing tax evasion.80 By extension, the authors find that the flat tax
helped generate greater revenues for Russia in 2001 and the years to follow.81 The
authors also look at increased productivity as a result of the tax reform and find that the
increased productivity due to the tax reform is small relative to the tax evasion
response.82 Thus, the efficiency gain the authors find, though existent, is smaller than
prior approaches.83

76

Gorodnichenko, Yuriy; Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge, and Klara Sabirianova Peter. “Myth and Reality of Tax
Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and Welfare Effects in Russia. NBER Working Paper
13719. National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2008.
77
Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Peter, p. 4.
78
Ibid. p. 4.
79
Ibid. p. 3.
80
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One source of potential problems with the 2005 IMF and 2008 NBER papers is
that their data source, the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey is a voluntary survey,
meaning the best and worst off people in society are underrepresented. This can be both
because people are unwilling to disclose their actual income and because they have no
home, and the RLMS is an address based survey.84 Additionally, the data used in
analyzing Russia is affected by the country’s increasingly valuable energy resources, with
natural gas prices reaching a peak in 2001.85 The authors of the 2005 IMF paper reject the
idea that energy prices alone could have contributed to the increase in personal income
tax revenue.86 However, the presence of this variable invites research in other countries
without such a confounding effect. Finally, the existing literature looks at a relatively
short time span (since 2001), and examining countries with longer time elapsed since
reform can be useful in understanding the effect of flat taxes.
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Methodology
The existing literature measures tax revenue, compliance, and labor supply,
primarily focusing on Russian data and surveys. In order to more effectively understand
the effect of the flat tax on transitional economies in general, and on the Baltic countries
in particular, this work attempts to expand the base and scope of existing analysis. The
first approach will be to examine the flat tax in each of the Baltic countries: the
background and reasons for implementation as well as the effect of the flat tax and the
discussion surrounding it.
The country level analysis for Estonia and Latvia will primarily focus on the
effect of the flat tax on labor supply. The analysis for Estonia is from a Bank of Estonia
working paper by Karsten Staehr, “Estimates of Employment and Welfare Effects of
Personal Labour Income Taxation in a Flat-Tax Country: The Case of Estonia.”87 Staehr
looks at how people react to economic incentives, particularly personal income taxes, in
the labor market using the 2005 Estonian Labour Force Survey, comprised of
approximately 16,500 working age individuals, about 8,000 of which are active in the
labor market. Latvia’s labor participation decision was also examined. Due to a lack of
data, there is no labor supply analysis on Lithuania. The only household or individual
level information for Lithuania was proprietary. Therefore, the discussion regarding
Lithuania is general, examining macroeconomic indicators such as GDP and tax
revenues.
The discussion of the flat tax in each of the Baltic countries is heavily weighted
towards Estonia. This is for a variety of reasons. Firstly, there is significantly more
information available about its early years after gaining independence in general. The
87
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prime minister of Estonia at the time, Mart Laar, wrote both a book as well as articles
about Estonia’s experience since gaining independence in general and its experience with
the flat tax in particular, and this does not exist for Latvia and Lithuania. While there are
accounts of various parts of the transitional years available from a variety of sources on
these countries, there is not information available as comprehensive as that for Estonia.
Additionally, when reaching out to contacts in each of the Baltic states, people
from Estonia were generally more responsive. After contacting the directors of every
major research institute in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three people were forthcoming
with information from Estonia, while two from Latvia were and only one from Lithuania
was. Finally, the only analysis completed on the effect of the flat tax in any of the Baltic
states was on Estonia. Therefore, when looking at the Baltic states on a country by
country level, the analysis is really weighted towards Estonia. Even though Latvia and
Lithuania are discussed on an individual level, these countries are really used to look at
the Baltic states on an aggregate level and compare them with other former Soviet Union
countries.
The aggregate analysis, focusing on the effect of the flat tax across a group of
countries is conducted using several methods. The effect on revenue and GDP is analyzed
by the World Bank using a “differences-in-differences” method. A fixed effect regression
was also used to examine the effect on GDP, growth and inflation. The effect on equity,
or extent of income redistribution was conducted by examining Gini coefficients. This
analysis, conducted by Salman Zaidi of the World Bank, compares Gini coefficients
across time, across countries, and before and after tax payments. The discussion on
compliance and simplicity is mainly based on anecdotal and descriptive evidence, with
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the exception of a case study of Russia conducted by IKK, since these measures are by
nature difficult to measure and quantify.
A major difficulty with the analysis on the flat tax is data aggregation. In general,
data for the early 1990s in transitional economies is inconsistent and unreliable, as those
economies had a limited state apparatus and resources for recording information. This
was particularly apparent in aggregating personal income tax revenue information, which
was of greatest relevance for an analysis on the flat tax. The only available information
that consistently provided personal income tax revenue information starting before 1994
was personal income tax as a percentage of GDP. This was the greatest challenge when
looking at aggregate information, particularly when conducting a cross country analysis.
When looking at individual countries, the aggregation of labor supply data posed a
challenge. Even though household level data was available for Latvia, it yielded peculiar
results in which people worked less as their wages increased. This suggested that there
was something wrong with the dataset, either in measurement techniques or sampling.
Thus, overall, the greatest challenge in examining the flat tax lies in the empirical
analysis.
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The Case of Estonia
Background
Estonia, located on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea, borders Latvia to the south,
Russia to the East, and Finland across the sea. Its territory is 45,226 square kilometers
and had a population of approximately 1.34 million at the beginning of January 2007.88 It
declared its independence from Germany in 1918 and was occupied by the Soviet Union
in 1940.89 When Estonia received its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, its
economy was devastated. Life under communist rule caused serious setbacks to the
country’s growth. While Estonians enjoyed a similar standard of living to its neighbor
Finland prior to communist rule in 1939, by 1987, Estonia’s growth domestic product
was about $2000 per capita, compared to Finland’s of $14,370.90 Any hopes that the
removal of communism would revitalize the economy were challenged soon after
Estonia’s independence.
In 1992, industrial production declined by more than 30 percent – a decline more
severe than the Great Depression – price inflation ran at more than 1,000 percent, and
fuel prices rose by more than 10,000 percent. Estonia, completely dependent on Russia,
which accounted for 92 percent of Estonian trade, had little to offer the foreign markets.
Stores in Estonia were empty, and bread and dairy products were rationed as people stood
in lines to buy food.91 As inflation increased – prices increased twenty-two fold between
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1991 and 1992 – banks ran out of money to distribute salaries and pensions.92 In March
1992, completely depleted of the Estonian currency, the town of Tartu introduced its own
currency, which was printed on the back of old Soviet ration coupons.93
Looking into a bleak future, Estonians saw the need for change and on July 6,
1992, the Estonian Supreme Council decided that the first democratic elections since
World War II should be held on September 20, 1992.94 The newly elected government
was led by Pro Patria Union, a radical reform-minded right of center party, composed of
smaller right-wing parties.95 Of the 680,044 citizens entered in the electoral register,
458,052 or 67.8 percent voted, and the Pro Patria coalition received 22 percent of the
votes.96 After no presidential candidate won a majority during the first round of elections,
Lennart Meri, the Pro Patria candidate, won the presidential elections in the second
round. Pro Patria then named Mart Laar its candidate for Prime Minister. Laar, who
began his term as prime minister at the age of 32 years old, proceeded to build a coalition
in the Riigikogu, the Estonian parliament. On October 19, the Riigikogu authorized Laar
to form the Government of the Republic.97

Mart Laar, the Architect of Estonia’s Economic Reforms
Laar, who served as the Estonian prime minister from 1992 to 1994 and 1999 to
2002 saw Estonias’s emergence from communism as an opportunity to reform. Looking
to Lescek Balcerowicz, the designer of the Polish economic reformation, Laar noted that
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a radical economic program, launched as quickly as possible, had a better chance of
success than several prolonged measures.98 Balcerowicz’s theory was based on the
assumption that domestic liberalization and freedom from foreign domination create a
mass psychology in which the people in which the people are more likely to consider
major changes than in a normal situation. This mass psychology allows the opportunity
for major political reforms.99 Thus, Laar saw a short window of opportunity, during
which, radical reforms had to be passed in order to ensure their success.100 He noted that
transitional economies that do not utilize this time of “extraordinary politics” would greet
less favorable economic conditions going forward.101
Thus, Laar immediately set forth with a series of economic reforms. Considering
the lack of resources and small time frame he saw available, Laar wanted the reforms to
be as simple as possible.102 His first goal was macroeconomic stabilization. Monetary
reform in Estonia had begun prior to Laar’s election with the Estonian kroon introduced
in June 1992 as the national currency.103 Using a currency board system, the kroon was
pegged to the German mark, the Deutsche mark, at one German mark for eight kroons.104
The Deutsche mark was a strong currency, and the kroon began to create confidence in
the Estonian economy.105
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The next step in macroeconomic stabilization was balancing the budget, which
required major cuts in subsidies as well as reducing the size of the government.106 These
changes included the cutting of subsidies for state-owned companies, which led to the
development of private companies.107 All endowments and subsidies were cut first,
followed by restrictions were placed on internal costs and ministry investments.108
Though the International Monetary Fund offered a loan to balance the budget, Laar and
the Estonian parliament refused, choosing to “build the future of Estonia on the
momentum for radical reforms, not loans.”109 After several months, the Estonian
parliament succeeded in balancing the budget and presented the balance budget to the
Riigikogu on December 14, 1992.110 From that point on the parliament required that only
a balanced budget could be presented to the Estonian parliament.111
Laar noted that essential to the success of the reforms was changing the attitude of
the Estonian people. He said that many “had to be shaken free of the illusion…that
somehow somebody else would solve their problems for them.”112 Laar said that under
the Soviet Union, people were not used to taking initiatives or assuming risks and that the
people needed to be energized and take responsibility for themselves.113 Cutting subsidies
to state owned industries gave those of the Soviet mentality the message that they needed
to begin working in order to succeed.114
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By 1993, the inflation rate dropped to 89.8 percent from 1,000 percent in 1992.
By 1995, it reached 29 percent. Trade began to look westward and exports grew
rapidly.115 With what Laar considered the first stages of reform, monetary reform and
macroeconomic stabilization, he began the second stage of reforms. One of the next steps
Estonia took in its reforms was opening its economy to world markets, reducing trade
tariffs and non-trade barriers and abolishing export restriction, with nearly all export
restrictions were removed by 1992.116 The free trade policy increased competition,
growth, and reconstruction, ultimately bringing Estonia new companies, which opened
export oriented factories.117 Estonia refused aid during this time, looking to free trade as a
way to increase foreign direct investment and growth.118
The final major economic reform that occurred in the early transition years was
privatization. The government eliminated all state banks, implemented property reform,
and privatized the economy.119 The development of a legal order created a favorable
environment for a market economy to develop, for foreign investment to take place, and
to combat corruption.120 The first laws of property reform were passed in early 1992,
focusing on returning nationalized or confiscated property to the original legal owners.121
When returning property was not possible, people were given privatization vouchers as
compensation. The privatization vouchers allowed people to purchase minority shares of
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privatized companies or land. By the end of May 1994, about 50 percent of state-owned
businesses or enterprises were transferred into private ownership or control.122

The Flat Tax
On January 1, 1994, Estonia introduced a flat-rate personal income tax of 26
percent, thereby becoming the first European country to adopt a flat personal income
tax.123 Previously, Estonia followed a progressive tax system with the top personal
income tax rate in 1993 held at 33 percent.124 The former system included a personal
income tax, a corporate income tax, and a value added tax. Social security benefits were
funded by a 20 percent payroll tax.125
The implementation of the flat tax was done almost entirely on Laar’s personal
initiative.126 In explaining his motivation for the flat tax introduction, Laar argued that in
order to achieve a favorable business environment, limiting regulation was not enough.127
He claimed that people’s enthusiasm towards starting new companies declined
considerably when realizing “the tax system punished success”128 and said that Estonia
needed a tax system that favored saving and investment.129 His objectives were to
implement a system that was simple, inexpensive to apply, and was as transparent and
understandable as possible.130 As a transitional economy with a weak state apparatus,
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Laar explained that Estonia would face major challenges implementing and collecting
revenues complex, Western-like model tax system. He wanted a tax system to have as
broad a base and as few exemptions as possible so that there would be a minimized
incentive to avoid tax payments. He also noted that tax rates should be low in order to
encourage activity in the economy.131
However, initially seen as a radical measure, the idea of a flat tax did not receive a
lot of support initially.132 At the beginning stages, international advisers and local
bureaucracy both opposed the flat tax, arguing that it would not work, and that if it did, it
would destroy the “pillars of society.”133 Facing a tight state budget, Ministry of
Financial Affairs officials thought the idea was very risky.134 When the government
proposed the bill of the new Income Tax Act to the Riigikogu on September 13, 1993, it
faced several heated debates. Finally a compromised was reached with the bill’s
opponents, and on December 8, 1993, the Riigikogu passed the new Income Tax Act and
established a 26 percent income tax for both businesses and people.135 Even once the act
was passed, however, people were opposed to it as well.136
The flat tax reform took place concurrently with other fiscal reforms. Estonia
entered into agreements with several countries, including Finland, Sweden, and Germany
in order to improve co-operation between national tax boards and avoid double taxation
between countries. Additionally excise duties were increased. This increase, however, led

131

Laar, “The Estonian Economic Miracle,” p. 9.
Laar, Estonia: Little Country that Could, p. 273.
133
Laar, Estonia: Little Country that Could, p. 274.
134
Ibid, p. 274.
135
Ibid, pp. 274-275.
136
Ibid, p. 276.
132

Deena Greenberg

Page 26

3/24/2009

to a great deal of alcohol and tobacco smuggling, which ultimately lost the state hundreds
of millions of kroons.137
The flat tax remained in place when Pro Patria government was voted out of
government one year after the reform, in 1995, one year after the reform, and has
remained in place throughout different ruling parties and coalitions until today.138 Its
overall framework has remained intact, though exemptions and rates have fluctuated.
Additionally, there has been a pension reform, which changed the allocation of social tax
revenue as well as an introduction of compulsory unemployment insurance.139 The two
parties that have been proponents of the flat tax since the beginning of discussions are the
Pro Patria and Estonia reform parties.140 There has been some opposition to the flat tax
from the left wing Estonian Centre Party, which made it a general point in the past three
elections. However, so far the Central Party has been willing to drop this in return for a
chance to join the coalition, demonstrating that those who oppose the flat tax do not place
replacing the tax very high on their agenda.141

Estonia’s Tax System
Estonia’s tax system consists of an income tax, a value added tax, excise taxes,
and a social tax. There are also a few taxes set by local governments, including land tax
and sales tax, but the share of these taxes is negligible in overall taxation.142 The benefit
system is also largely national, with municipalities providing a few small local
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benefits.143 The personal income tax operates on a flat rate, which began at 26 percent in
1994 and has gradually been decreased to 21 percent.144 Along with the personal income
tax, there is a basic allowance, currently 2,250 EEK, as well as an increased basic
allowance in the case of children, a pension allowance, and a sickness allowance. These
allowances can be deducted from a person’s income during the taxation period. In
addition to the allowances, there are several tax deductions, which include compulsory
unemployment insurance contribution payments, housing loan interest payments, and
training expenses.145 Estonia’s government revenue comprises about one third of its total
GDP.146

External Influences
In the early years of Estonia’s transition, there were a number of sources that
helped shape Laar and the early government’s thinking about reforms. Think-tanks from
abroad, such as the Heritage Foundation, the International Republican Institute, and the
Adam Smith Institute147 in addition to the newly formed local Estonian think-tanks,
served as one influencing. These think tanks organized events at which most of the
reform agenda was presented and discussed.148 Additionally, though Laar did not adopt
specific recommendations from large foreign entities, he did look to the principles of
international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and EC Phare programme.149
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Additionally, Estonia looked to other transition countries’ experiences when
creating and implementing its reforms, with West Germany serving as a major source of
influence. The June 20 date of Estonia’s currency reform purposely coincided that of
West Germany’s forty-four years earlier. 150 Laar was a Christian democrat, familiar with
the work of Erhardt and other West German thinkers, and he and the other reformers
looked to West Germany when implementing his reforms in Estonia.151 Such principles
Laar looked to included monetary stability, free market entry, the institution of private
property, and a liberal economic policy, with limited intervention in economic affairs.152
A feature of West Germany that played an important role in Estonia’s development was
to carry out economic reforms rather than create a welfare state.153
However, the closest examples were those in Eastern and Central Europe. The
Polish reform consisted of balancing the public sector budget, limited central bank
financing, and economic policies lined to income policies and fixed exchange rates.154
The goal was to create an economy with private ownership, free markets, and integration
into the world markets.155 Laar studied the Polish economy, noting its successes such as
shock therapy, and mistakes, such as the lack of institutional reform.156 Laar also looked
to Hungary’s abolition of special advantages given to foreign investments, the Czech
Republic’s privatization, and East Germany’s establishment of separate agencies to assist
privatization.157
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With regard to the flat tax specifically, Laar looked to Milton Friedman, who
proposed a proportional income tax when creating its tax reform.158 The only other
models of a flat tax for Laar to examine were in Jersey, Guernsey, and Hong Kong.159
Laar does in fact point to Hong Kong, which implemented a 15 percent flat personal
income tax in 1947, and the success of the flat tax there when promoting Estonia’s tax
structure.160 Laar saw Estonia as “the Hong Kong of Europe,” according to Karsten
Staehr, Professor of International and Public Finance and banking and Chair of Finance
and Banking at Tallinn University of Technology in Estonia.161 Staehr explained that
Laar drew a comparison based on China’s proximity to Russia but contact and
relationship with the rest of the world.162

Evaluation of Estonia’s Flat Tax System
Personal income tax, general government revenue, and GDP have increased since
the adoption of a flat tax. However, the revenue increase has not been consistent, and the
revenue and GDP figures alone do not indicate any conclusive impact of the flat tax.
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Additionally, as measured by simplicity Estonia’s tax system has demonstrated
signs of success. Anecdotally, there is a perception that overall people support the tax
system, it is seen as fair, and there is a general belief that compliance has increased.163
Filing returns can be done in about 10 to 15 minutes, and 84 percent of people file
online.164 There were several macroeconomic indicators to indicate economic
improvement since January 1, 1994, although it is difficult to isolate the effect of the flat
tax. Staehr said that the simplicity, clarity and transparency of the system allowed
economic occur, but the tax system is now what turned the country around. “Estonia got a
163
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tax system that was fairly transparent so it didn’t stand in the way for the economy
turning around,” Staehr said.165
The most comprehensive analysis completed on Estonia’s taxation system is
presented in a Bank of Estonia working paper by Karsten Staehr, “Estimates of
Employment and Welfare Effects of Personal Labour Income Taxation in a Flat-Tax
Country: The Case of Estonia.”166 Staehr looks at how people react to economic
incentives in the labor market. Staehr uses the 2005 Estonian Labour Force Survey,
comprised of approximately 16,500 working age individuals, about 8,000 of which are
active in the labor market to examine the employment and welfare effects of personal
labor income taxation.
Staehr first distinguishes between the extensive decision of whether or not to
participate in the labor force and the intensive decision of how many hours to work. He
looks at people from across income groups and evaluates how a change in tax rates
affects both their decision to participate in the labor force and how much labor to supply
if they are participating.167 The average tax rate affects the extensive decision of whether
or not to work at all, while the marginal tax rate affects the intensive margin of how many
hours to work.168 He examines labor force participation as a decision between other uses
of time and working.169 The Estonian Labor Force Survey provides information only on
labor force participation, not hours worked. The number of hours worked are determined
as a function of the hourly after-tax return on employment and other variables.170
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The first stage in his analysis is to create a function that predicts individual’s
income as a function of individual characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, and
education. He estimates the log of hourly labor income171 and uses this to predict the pay
for all of the individuals in the same, including the approximate 1,600 people who
reported not having an income when they were active in the labor market and the 600
people who were not working.172 Staehr suggests that the low predicted average hourly
rate (about 19.5 EEK per hour) may be a reason for non-participation in the work
force.173
The next part of Staehr’s analysis is his examination individuals’ labor supply.
Staehr does this using Heckman’s selection model.174 His analysis shows that different
factors determine participation versus hours supplied in the labor market.175 The labor
supply depends on the log after-tax pay as well as other characteristics such as age,
gender, and education.176 He also looks at labor supply across different income groups
based on their hourly income: low, middle-low, middle-high, and high.177 As in the
general case, the hourly after-tax wage affects the labor participation positively.178 The
labor elasticities are significant for labor participation but not for the intensive margin,
indicating that after-tax income does not affect the hours individuals work in a
meaningful way.179 This must be considered, however, along with the fact, that the
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concentration of hours spent working in the labor survey were at 0 and 40 hours a week,
since most people do not work part time.180 The labor elasticities found are generally in
line with those found in other studies.181
Staehr’s analysis, particularly that of elasticities of labor supply, has a number of
implications for Estonia’s tax system. He suggests that tax rates affect participation in the
labor market, while has only a negligible effect on working hours of those already active
in the labor force.182 He includes several assumptions in his discussions. One assumption
is that individuals will react the same way whether the change in after-tax income is from
taxes or another factor. A second assumption is that tax rate changes affect only labor
supply and not other factors such as income prior to taxes. Thirdly, it is assumed that
there is a long enough time horizon that any response in labor supply can take place.183
The fourth assumption is that the analysis is constrained by the lack of information on the
behavior and income sources of non-working individuals.184 A change in the personal
income tax affects labor supply by affecting the average tax rate. Finally, lack of
information forces Staehr not to include certain tax exemptions.185
Staehr conducts two different tax policy experiments to look at effect on labor
supply. In the first experiment, the basic exemption is reduced from 1700 EEK to 1530
EEK per month. The low and middle group decreased their employment substantially,
while the high income group was less affected and has a relatively low labor participation
elasticity. The total employment decreases by 0.48 percentage point.186 In the second
180
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experiment, Staehr increases the tax rate by 1 percentage point so that average post-tax
hourly income decreases the most for those in the high income group.187 However, the
greatest increases in employment are found in the middle income groups because they
have higher labor elasticities. In this experiment, total employment decreased by 0.36
percentage points.188 Both of these experiments suggest that tax changes have sizeable
effects, which are basically comparable between the experiments.189 The first experiment,
however, has the greatest effect among the low income group, while the second has the
greatest effect among the middle groups.
The final step in Staehr’s analysis is the examination of the marginal cost of
public funds (MCPF) from raising personal income taxes.190 The marginal cost of public
funds is a measure of the cost to the private sector from a marginal increase in tax
revenue.191 It is essentially the money lost to society from employers not employing and
employees providing labor at the socially efficient point and is measured by 1 plus the
amount of initial tax revenue displaced per 1 EEK generated.192 The MCPF in his
analysis is about 4.7 for the low income group, 4.3 for the middle-low income group, 2.3
for the middle-high income group, and 1.3 for the high income group.193 These results
make sense, since for a low income worker, in order to raise an additional 1 EEK of
revenue, the income tax pressure must be raised significantly, which lowers employment
and decreases initial tax revenue. For a high income worker, it would not require as much
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income tax pressure to raise 1 EEK of revenue and high income workers are less
responsive to a change in taxes.194
Table 3. The Marginal Cost of Public Funds, Two Different Tax Policies

Low

Middlelow

Middlehigh

High

Full
(a)
sample

Baseline
Basic exemption lowered

4.65

4.28

2.30

1.34

1.83

Tax rate increased

4.65

4.28

2.30

1.34

1.62

Basic exemption lowered

1.56

1.58

1.38

1.15

1.28

Tax rate increased

1.56

1.58

1.38

1.15

1.23

Basic exemption lowered

18.24

108.11

3.74

1.49

2.45

Tax rate increased

18.24

108.11

3.74

1.49

1.99

Excluding pension contributions

Including value added tax

(a) Full sample results are calculated using weights of each sub-sample.
(b) The starting point is a basic exemption equal to 1700 EEK and a tax rate equal to 24%.
Source: Staehr, p. 38

Staehr’s paper is the first to consider the welfare cost of taxation in Estonia and
one of the few that quantify the welfare effect of taxation for transitional countries. It
looks at the labor elasticity, or labor responsiveness, to a change in the marginal tax rate.
Labor elasticity is relevant to the flat tax since the idea of taxation is that at higher levels
it disincentives people from working. Therefore, the government would want to tax
people who are less responsive to the tax in order to eliminate the loss to society from
people not working, and tax the people who are more responsive to a tax less, since they
will provide labor regardless. Staehr’s analysis shows that low income individuals are the
most responsive to a change in tax rate. Therefore, taxing low income individuals will
cause them to stop working while the high income group will generally continue to work.
Given this information, it would be more efficient to have a more progressive tax where
194
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the low income people are taxed less and the higher income are taxed more. Therefore,
Staehr’s findings indicate that the current Estonian flat tax is inefficient in that more
revenue may be achieved by taxing the higher income people more and the lower income
people less.
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The Case of Latvia
Background
Located in between Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia has a population of
approximately 2.23 million.195 Its geography is strategically important, as the capitals of
both Estonia and Lithuania are within a few hour drive, and Latvia serves as a transport
route between Russia and western Europe.196 Its main sources of foreign direct
investment are nearby countries, primarily Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and
Estonia.197 Latvia initially gained its independence after the first World War but was
occupied again in World War II and then became part of the Soviet Union.198 Although
Latvia emerged independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, it was deeply embedded in
the planned economy. The conditions in newly independent Latvia were dismal, with an
annual inflation rate of more than 900 percent in 1992.199
Like Estonia, Latvia chose a “shock therapy” model of reform, which included
rapidly transitioning to a market economy while simultaneously implementing legislative
change.200 Reforms in Latvia began as early as early 1991 when state regulations were
removed from retail price setting. Monetary reforms began in 1992, with the introduction
of the Latvian rubble as a temporary currency on May 7. Soviet rubble circulation was
stopped on June 20, 1992.201 By 1993, people began to gain confidence in the markets the
when the currency was stabilized. Foreign trade had already begun to be directed to the
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west, and the exports to Russia and other eastern ports were beginning to decline.202
Through controlling the money supply, the Bank of Latvia brought inflation down to 2.6
percent in December 1992 kept it at less than 3 percent a month through the following
December. In 1993, the annual inflation rate was reduced to 35, and it reached 28 percent
in 1994.203
On March 5, 1993, the second stage of Latvian monetary reform began with the
introduction of the lats (1 lats = 200 rubles). The lats was pegged to the Special Drawing
Rights, which is a basket of currencies in the IMF’s unit of account.204 The currency
reform led to macroeconomic stabilization, a stabilized exchange rate, and a reduction of
inflation relatively quickly. However, the reform also led to a banking crisis, since many
banks attracted depositers with high interest rates, hoping inflation would remain high. In
1995, several commercial banks either went bankrupt or suspended operations.205
Latvia also engaged in privatization during the early 1990s. This occurred at a
slower pace than expected given Latvia’s experience with a private economy prior to
World War II. By mid-October 1993, only nineteen out of more than 2,000 state-run
businesses were privatized, and an agency charged in charge of privatizing industry was
established only in November 1993.206 A main reason for this was because the Latvian
government attempted to honor the claims of former owners or their descendants to
regain property, and the right to make these claims was upheld until the end of 1993.207
Thus, while retail and services, small manufacturing and agricultural enterprises engaged
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in rapid privatization in the early 1990s, Privatization of large state enterprises and
apartments, however, did not begin until the mid 1990s and occurred at a much slower
pace, with most large industries not privatized until 1999.208
During the 1990s the economic structure of Latvia changed as well. In 1990,
manufacturing comprised the greatest percentage of GDP, accounting for 35.6 percent. In
2001, services accounted for 70.4 percent of GDP with manufacturing accounting for
about 20. Transport of oil accounted for the main growth item in the service sector, while
manufacturing declined largely because of the close of big industrial enterprises.209
Latvia also executed strict budgetary control to bring inflation down.210

The Flat Tax
A main reason for the flat tax was to increase the simplicity of tax administration.
Prior to the flat tax implementation, Latvia was operating a tax system, enacted in 1991,
with five rates ranging between 15 and 35 percent.211 Like in Estonia, the reforms of the
early 1990s took place rapidly, and there was little room to discuss long term change.212
Additionally, like the other reforms in Latvia, the flat tax reflected the sentiment that now
that Latvia was free of excessive government intervention, people wanted to move in the
opposite direction.213 People became “eager…radical political ideas,” according to one
source who was there at the time, and “passionately believed in it.” In 1994, the personal
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income tax rate was set at 25 percent, with the top marginal tax rate of 35 percent. In
1997, the 25 percent rate was fixed for all levels of income.214
Unlike in Estonia, the flat tax was not widely debated in Latvia.215 Professor
George Viksnins of Georgetown University, who served as senior advisor to the Latvian
Central Bank from 1992 until 2006, said that there was not a large public reaction.216 The
people “just adjusted,” according to Raita Karnite, a researcher at Institute of Economics,
Latvian Academy of Sciences..217 She said that Social Democrats wanted a differentiated
tax structure, but they composed only a small part of decision makers.218 Viksnins
attributed the lack of debate to the fact that so much of people’s income was received in
the informal economy. He explained that generally people’s salary was composed of the
formal income, which was taxable, and the “envelop money.” Since envelop money was
negotiated with the employer and given informally and secretly, it was untaxed. Viksnins
argued that people did not debate tax rates because if they were too high, people would
“put more [of their salary] in the envelop.”219 Karnite also said that an argument for the
flat tax was that under a progressive tax, people who earned more were more likely to
hide their incomes.220
The flat tax is still not under serious public debate in Latvia; the main discussions
revolve around the size of the tax, which since its implementation has been reduced to 25
percent.221 The idea of moving away from the flat tax has generally not been discussed in
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public forums.222 However, some individuals express discontent with the tax system. One
individual who works for a bank in Latvia but wishes to remain unnamed due to political
sensitivity, argues that the tax system has “undermined [growth] in a very dangerous
way.” He said that although simplicity may have helped tax collections to an extent, most
statements made about the flat tax are unfounded. He said that lower tax rates would
make collection easier independent of the flat tax. He believes that people in the 90s had
“childhood trauma” or socialism and state intervention, which had caused those opposed
to the flat tax to be stigmatized. This person believes that now that there is an economic
crisis, where Latvia and other flat tax countries are suffering, and progressive tax
countries surviving, people will be able to challenge the basis and idea of a flat tax.

Influences
Like Estonia, Latvia was able to look to different countries and there were
external influences that played a role in the decision to make a flat tax. Latvia received
advice from international organizations, particularly the European Union, since Latvia
was trying to integrate into the EU at the time.223 Latvia’s government also consulted
with German tax specialists on the value added tax as well as consultants from Denmark.
Karnite said that research institutes did not play a role, as there were no economic
research institutes, and the economic research in universities mostly dealt with
education.224
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Latvian Tax System
In 1994, the “Law on Personal Income Tax” established a 25 percent income tax
rate on all levels of annual income225 except for a 10 percent tax on the highest income,
which was eliminated in 1997.226 Thus, the adoption of the flat tax caused the marginal
and average tax rates to increase for those with the highest levels of income. In 1995,
“The Law on Value Added Tax” set forth a 19 percent value added taxes. Some product
groups, such as newspapers and magazines, received a reduced 5 percent value added
tax.227 In 2004, the corporate tax rate was reduced from 35 percent to 15 percent,228
becoming one of the lowest in the EU.229

Evaluation of Latvia tax System
There have been no formal studies from the government or in universities on the
effect of the flat tax in Latvia. Since the flat tax, Latvia has seen overall a consistent
increase in GDP. However, this does not serve as any indication of the success of the flat
tax, only that the flat tax did not impediment to economic growth.
Chart 3. Latvia GDP (1992 – 2007)
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Looking at other macroeconomic indicators, there is also no conclusive indication of an
impact of the flat tax on personal income tax revenue, government revenue, or GDP.
While revenues have increased during this time, they also fell during some years, and it is
difficult to attribute an increase in revenues to the flat tax.
Chart 4a. Personal Income Tax Revenue
in Latvia During the Early Years of the
Flat Tax
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Chart 4b. Total Government Revenue in
Latvia During the Early Years of the Flat
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The effect of the flat tax on labor supply in Latvia was also examined. This
analysis was done using data from the World Bank’s Household Expenditure and Income
Data for Transitional Economies (HEIDE).230 The dataset contains household and
individual level data for people in Latvia from 1997 to 1998 and was analyzed data for
the male household heads. The information used in the analysis included gender, age,
education, labor force participation (employed or not working), wages, non-labor income,
and number of children (under the age of 14). Not working individuals included both
those who are unemployed and inactive, and only individuals above the age of 25 were
used in the analysis. Those who identified themselves as self-employed to be counted as

230
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employed and their income from self-employment was counted as part of their wages. In
this situation
The first step in the analysis is to estimate the wage one would receive based on
age and education. However, the problem with this estimation is that wages in the dataset
are only for those employed, creating a selection problem. The people who are already in
the workforce have certain characteristics and made certain decisions that enabled them
to work and these will be reflected in the wages they receive. Therefore, the labor force
participation should be taken into account as a factor in the wages instead of assuming
that unemployed people would receive comparable wages to those employed. Therefore,
in order to estimate, β for the wage in such a way, a Heckman selection model is used
(Table 4).231
The “select” component of the table shows the coefficients, or effect, of
independent variables (age, education, non-labor income, and number of children) on the
decision to work. Using this information, the “wagey” component of the table shows the
effect of the variables age and education on wage received. Using these coefficients, the
potential wage for non-working people can be predicted. Using the new wage for
unemployed people found through the Heckman selection model, a probit232 regression is
used to predict the effect of wage on labor force participation.

231

The Heckman selection model used to account for selection bias. This occurs when the independent
variables depend on unmeasured variables, which also impact the independent variable. Here, the wages in
the model are just for those who are working, which presents a bias in the wage data. Therefore, the
regresion first models whether or not one is employed. Then, using this information, it models what the
wage would be based on different factors.
232
A probit regression is a nonlinear regression model designed for binary dependent variables. (Stock and
Watson, 389) In this case, the dependent variable was binary with the outcomes unemployment = 0 and
unemployment = 1. Each coefficient given by the probit regression gives the expected change in the
probability that Y (labor force status) = 1. (Stock and Watson, 391)
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Table 4. Heckman Selection Model: The Effect of Age and Education on Wage
Coef.
Wagey

Select

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

95% Conf. Interval

AGE

3.899

2.727

1.43

0.153

-1.447

9.244

AGE2

-0.031

0.032

-0.99

0.325

-0.093

0.031

Educat

54.130

4.138

13.08

0.000

46.020

62.240

_cons

-86.847

61.436

-1.41

0.157

-207.260

33.566

AGE

0.165

0.018

9.07

0.000

0.129

0.200

AGE2

-0.002

0.000

-12.04

0.000

-0.003

-0.002

Educat

0.268

0.028

9.48

0.000

0.213

0.324

-0.002

0.000

-5.82

0.000

-0.003

-0.001

0.068

0.034

1.97

0.049

0.000

0.135

_cons

-2.547

0.445

-5.73

0.000

-3.419

-1.676

/athrho

-0.155

0.081

-1.90

0.057

-0.314

0.005

/lnsigma

4.970

0.017

293.15

0.000

4.936

5.003

NONLABORY
CHILDN

Rho

-0.153

0.079

-0.30

0.005

Sigma

143.971

2.441

139.27

148.835

Lambda

-22.086

11.558

-44.74

0.568

Source: HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98

Table 5. Probit Regression: The Effect of Wage, Education, and Children on Labor Force
Participation
Lfs

Coef.

Std. Err.

WAGEITAX

-0.001
0.464

Educat
CHILDN
_cons

z

P>|z|

95% Conf. Interval

0.000

-3.71

0.000

-0.002

-0.001

0.026

17.52

0.000

0.412

0.516

0.425

0.029

14.65

0.000

0.368

0.482

-1.049

0.066

-15.9

0.000

-1.178

-0.920

Source: HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98

Looking at the probit regression there is a negative coefficient on wage in the
probit regression. The negative coefficient on age is not what economic theory would
predicts; a negative coefficient on wage indicates that as wage increases, people are less
likely to work. There are a number of possibilities for why this outcome would occur for
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the analysis. One reason is that the data itself is inaccurate: people reported inaccurately
or it was transcribed and input inaccurately. A second possibility is that the labor force
composition in transitional economies is unique in that the older generation was educated
in a communist country while the younger generation was educated in a democratic,
capitalist country. This could cause the older generation, who receive higher wages (this
is indicated through the Heckman analysis) to be less useful in the new economy and
therefore employed less.
A third possibility is that those who earn the highest wages will enter the informal
economy. This is particularly relevant since the data is from 1997 to 1998. In 1997, the
10 percent tax on income for those in the highest tax bracket was eliminated, causing all
levels of income to be taxed at 25 percent.233 As George Viksnins of Georgetown
University explained, people did not debate tax rates because if they were too high,
people would receive more of their salary informally, either through the informal sector
or untaxed income. Thus, this analysis suggests that it is possible the flat tax actually
caused increased involvement in the underground economy. If this is the case, then the
flat tax in Latvia may have had a negative impact on the formal economy.
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The Case of Lithuania
Background
The largest and most populated Baltic state, Lithuania is located to the south of
Latvia and also shares borders with Belarus, Poland, and Russia.234 Lithuania is a home
to 3.4 million citizens, 67 percent of which live in urban areas.235 After losing its
independence to the Soviet Union in World War II, Lithuania re-established it in March
1990, thereby becoming the first Soviet republic to declare independence.236 Like the
other Baltic states, Lithuania faced a dismal economic situation upon gaining its
independence. During its early years after independence, more than 90 percent of
Lithuania’s trade was with the rest of the former Soviet Union and it operated an
inefficient industrial sector.237 Between 1991 and 1993, Lithuania’s industrial output
dropped by half and faced an even sharper decline in agricultural production.238 Inflation,
increased from 225 percent in 1991 to 1,100 percent in 1992, while wages dropped by 30
percent that year.239
Thus, soon after gaining independence, Lithuania underwent a series of reforms.
Among these was a privatization reform. In 1991, the Law on Initial Privatization of State
Property was passed, and from 1991 to 1995 Lithuania enacted a voucher privatization
program, which restored agricultural land to former owners and provided former
collective farm workers land. It also moved housing from state to private ownership and
transferred ownership of small and medium enterprises from state to private ownership
Between 1992 and 1994, Lithuania saw rapid privatization especially for small
234
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businesses, farms and houses, and by November 1994, more than 5,000 enterprises had
been privatized.240 The voucher privatization generated nearly Lt 150 million in proceeds
(more than US$40 million), most of which were received by State Privatization Fund.241
Another major reform undertaken in Lithuania was monetary reform. On June 25, 1993,
the central bank introduced the litas as the national currency, which became the sole form
of tender that August. It was pegged at the US dollar.242
At the beginning of its independence, Lithuania had hundreds of different types of
taxes, which served as its main sources of budget revenues. At the beginning of the
transition, however, budget revenues fell, as activity moved to the private sector and
“hidden” economies.243 In 1992, Lithuania saw its lowest revenue collection, when tax
revenue fell to 26 percent. Yet even in 1992, Lithuania was beginning to see a
turnaround. That year, Lithuania’s inflation rate was reduced and lessened every each
year since. Since then, revenues have ranged between 27.5 and 32.5 percent of GDP, and
the country saw positive economic growth every year beginning in 1995.244
Among the changes that led to such outcomes in the early years of Lithuania’s
transition was a decrease in expenditure of Lithuania’s general government budget.245
Lithuania’s constitution was written at the beginning of the transition period. It defined
the fundamental elements of the Lithuanian public expenditure system as well as a state
and municipal budget. Thus from the beginning of independence, there was a unified
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state budget.246 Since independence, the government and parliament set a high priority
towards staying within the approved budget deficit, and the government has tried to
reduce the budget deficit in order to decrease inflation and contain the buildup of foreign
debt. Expenditures were decreased to 32.5 percent in 1994, 31.8 percent in1995, and 30.5
percent in 1996 as the government began to consolidate financial resources. Between
1994 and 1997, progress was made in reducing the budget deficit, with the fiscal deficit
declining to 1.8 percent of GDP in 1997.247
Another tool used to finance the budget deficit was treasury bills. In 1994,
Lithuania created a domestic treasury bills market, in 1995, a one-year treasury bond was
issued, and in 1998 two-year bonds were issued. From 1994 to 1997, more than one-third
of all bills were sold to foreign investors, and domestic treasury bills financed 65 percent
of the central government deficit in 1994 alone. Since 1994, the Lithuanian government
has focused on foreign financing of its debt. Within just a year, the central government
was able to increase foreign financing by more than 2.5 times and reduce domestic
financing. By 1997, the stock of treasury bills comprised almost 7 percent of GDP. This
strategy marked a change in Lithuania’s financing since, until 1995, international
financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and EBRD were the main sources of
external finance. However, since 1995, the Lithuanian government has been able to
access international capital markets, and in 1995 alone, $60 million were borrowed
through private Eurobond placements. By 1996, foreign commercial borrowing and bond
issues comprised 88 percent of overall debt financing.248
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The Flat Tax
Fiscal policy was also included in changes made in Lithuania. In 1991, upon
independence, Lithuania implemented a progressive tax system with tax rates ranging
between 18 and 33 percent. In 1994, the government set a fixed flat tax rate of 33
percent.249 However, according to Jonas Cicinskas, Lithuania had really seen a flat tax
system since the Soviet Union, which imposed a flat personal income tax of 13 percent
across the USSR. A flat personal income tax was the natural tax structure for the early
years of Lithuania’s independence Cicinskas explained. With a rapid pace of reforms and
precarious economic situation in Lithuania’s early years, discussions regarding taxes did
not attract a great deal of attention.250

Other Tax Reforms
Among the tax reforms introduced in the 1990s was the introduction of the
general turnover tax and then the VAT in 1994.251 The main motivation behind these
indirect taxes was to adopt a market-friendly tax system that was compatible with EU
requirements and to meet revenue needs. The share of indirect taxes, such as the VAT
and customs tax has been increasing this year. In practice it is easier to administer
indirect taxes than direct income taxes, and these taxes have contributed a large share of
state budget revenues.252 The VAT was introduced at 18 percent, and its share of the
national budget has risen from 29.5% in 1994 to 40% in 1998. Revenues from the excise
249

Stepanyan, Vahram. Reforming Tax Systems: Experience of the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of
the Former Soviet Union, p. 27.
250
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251
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252
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tax grew as well, going from accounting for 1.1% of GDP in 1994 to 3.1 percent in 1998.
It has a specific rate, therefore taking inflation into account.253 As opposed to the
implementation of indirect taxes, where a major motivating force was meeting EU
requirements, the creation of direct taxes was primarily internally driven. In 1993, direct
taxes accounted in the national budget accounted for 11 percent of GDP.254 By 1998, this
figure had dropped to 7 percent. Currently, Lithuania has a 24 percent personal income
tax rate and a 15 percent corporate tax rate.255
Another element to tax reform was a change in tax administration. In the 1990s,
the share of economic activity in shadow economy had reached 40 percent demonstrating
a need to improve tax administration and have more equitable distribution of the tax
burden.256 A reform in tax administration accompanied the changes in tax law. In 1995, a
tax administration law was passed by parliament, which established the Central Tax
office in accordance with European Union requirements. The administrative reforms
were aimed at reducing the number of local offices and increasing efficiency.257 From
1995 to1996, the central office of the State Tax Inspectorate, established to be distinct
from the Ministry of Finance, reorganized local tax offices according to function. By
1999, the State Tax Inspectorate established ten local district offices instead of 56.258
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Effect
Lithuania introduced a 33 percent flat tax rate, which was the highest personal
income tax rate the country had seen prior to reform, and tax revenues increased
subsequently.259 However, like in the case of Estonia and Latvia, it is difficult to
conclude an effect of the flat tax on revenues since other reforms occurred
simultaneously. Additionally, personal income tax revenues dropped to pre-reform levels
the year and there was no consistent increase of personal income or total government
revenues.

Chart 5a. Personal Income Tax Revenue in
Lithuania During the Early Years of the
Flat Tax
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Chart 5b. Total Government Revenue in
Lithuania During the Early Years of the
Flat Tax
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LTL billions

Chart 6. Lithuania GDP (1992 – 2007)
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Furthermore, there are years when GDP is increasing yet personal income tax revenues as
a percent of GDP are falling. Looking at absolute revenue, Lithuania has, with the
exception of 1995 seen an increase. However, the database whether this information if at
constant or current prices.

Chart 7. Personal Income Tax Revenue in Lithuania
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Lithuania also maintains the highest tax rate compared to its peers, which would
theoretically reduce compliance. Since the payoff from evading is higher, there would be
a greater incentive structure to evade taxes.260 The major challenge in analyzing the effect

260
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of the flat tax in Lithuania is the absence of non-proprietary household or individual level
information. Therefore, Lithuania is used to help understand the development of the flat
tax, but the specific effect on Lithuania is difficult to examine. However, Lithuania can
be used in aggregate, cross-country analyses in order to compare it to non-flat tax
countries.
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Overall Findings of the Flat Tax: Aggregate Analysis
Revenue and Growth Effects
Proponents of the flat tax claim that a flat tax would provide increased incentives
to work, leading to increased entrepreneurial activity and national output.261 However,
looking at the Baltic states, it is unclear if a flat tax yielded this effect. Since the flat tax
implementations, the Baltic states did greet increased personal income tax revenue
growth, both over time and in relation to other former Soviet Union countries. By 2000,
Estonia and Lithuania saw personal income tax revenue comprising almost 8 percent of
GDP.262 All three of the states had similar or higher levels of revenue as the beginning of
the transition process.263
Table 6. The Baltic States’ Personal Income Tax Revenue in Comparison to Other Former
Soviet Union Countries (% GDP)
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Estonia

7.0

8.2

7.9

8.7

8.3

8.1

8.5

8.7

7.8

Latvia

2.7

3.6

4.6

5.1

5.4

3.8

4.4

4.7

4.3

Lithuania

5.7

5.0

5.4

5.4

6.6

5.1

8.0

8.5

7.8

5.1

5.6

6.0

6.4

6.8

5.7

7.0

7.3

6.6

Armenia

-

1.6

1.2

1.3

1.3

1.8

1.6

1.9

1.4

Azerbaijan

-

2.4

1.5

1.1

1.6

2.1

2.5

2.7

-

Georgia

-

0.2

0.3

0.6

0.8

1.1

1.7

1.9

1.8

2.5

2.4

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.4

1.7

1.8

2.0

-

1.3

1.9

1.8

1.2

1.0

1.2

1.1

1.3

Moldova

1.8

1.6

1.7

2.5

2.5

2.8

2.2

1.6

1.5

Ukraine

-

2.0

3.0

2.9

3.3

3.5

3.5

3.4

3.8

2.5

2.8

2.6

2.8

3.6

4.0

4.0

4.1

3.6

-

-

-

-

1.1

1.2

1.0

1.1

1.2

3.5

2.8

2.9

3.1

3.1

3.1

3.3

3.4

3.2

2.6

1.9

1.9

2.0

2.1

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.2

Average

Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic

Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Russia
Average

Source: Recent economic developments, IMF; Stepanyan, p. 16
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The World Bank conducted a differences-in-differences estimation to analyze the
effect of flat tax reform on tax compliance, administration, and revenue generation.264
This type of analysis involves looking at a group of countries, which includes both those
who enacted the flat tax reform (the treatment group) and those that did not (the control
group).265 Looking at the outcomes of all the countries over time, the analysis helps
determine the effect of the treatment, or flat tax reform, on the countries who received
it.266 The results of this regression of a flat tax on revenue are not statistically significant
and therefore do not indicate an increase or decrease of revenues as a result of the flat tax
implementation.267 Real wage increase was the only variable significant at a 10 percent
confidence level.268 There were also inconclusive results for the effect of a change in
corporate income tax revenues.269
The effects of the flat tax on GDP and GDP growth were additionally examined
using a fixed effect regression analysis.270 This analysis also yielded inconclusive results.
A fixed effect regression analyzes the effect of something that occurs in each state but
varies across time, in this case the flat tax implementation. The analysis on the effect of
the flat tax on constant GDP yielded significant positive results at the 95 percent

264
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confidence level. However the analysis on the effect of the flat tax on the natural log271 of
GDP did not yield statistically significant results. The effects of a flat tax on growth were
also not significant at the 95 percent level.
A fixed effect regression was also used to examine the effect of flat taxes on
inflation, with the idea being inflation is a signal for poor economic growth. If there is a
lack of growth and revenues in the economy, governments will use inflation as a tool to
raise money. Again, the results were inconclusive. The effect of a flat tax on the average
consumer prices272 was significant at the 95 percent confidence level. However, this
yielded a positive affect on inflation. The effect of the flat tax on change in percent
change of consumer prices273 was not significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

Table 7. Effect of Flat Tax (Independent Variable)
Dependent
variable
GDP (constant)
Natural log of
GDP
GDP growth rate
Average
consumer prices

Coefficient
(a)
(on flat tax)

Robust
Standard
Error

t-statistic

P-statistic

987.881

352.968

2.80

0.006

288.310

1687.453

-0.030

0.033

-0.91

0.367

-0.096

0.036

0.020

0.014

1.47

0.146

-0.007

0.047

47.569

11.605

4.10

0.000

24.569

70.568

119.836

137.980

0.87

0.387

-153.846

393.519

95% confidence interval

Percent change
of consumer
prices

(a) Flat tax was an independent binary variable with 0 representing years prior to reform, 1 representing year of reform, and years after.
Source: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008, analysis by Deena Greenberg with
assistance from Flavio Cunha
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Natural log of GDP is a way to measure GDP growth, since a percent change is the difference between
natural logs.
272
Average consumer prices are measured by averages for the year. The index is based such that the year
2000 = 100. (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008)
273
Inflation is measured by annual percent change of average consumer prices for each year. (International
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008)
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It is difficult to analyze and draw any conclusions about the effect of the flat tax
across these countries for several reasons. Given that so many reforms were introduced
concurrently with the flat tax implementation, it is highly probable that a regression on
the flat tax will display some effect, regardless of whether or not there actually is
correlation. Additionally, for many flat tax countries, the reason why they implemented a
flat tax, among other reforms, was because they had a low level of GDP. Therefore, there
may be a timing correlation between flat tax implementation and a rise in GDP, but the
causality could be in reverse.
The specific revenue effects in the Baltic countries were discussed in the
preceding chapters. The only other major analysis of a flat tax was in a study on Russia.
Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm274 looked at the effects of the flat tax on Russia using
individual and household level data. In the Russian flat tax reform, the low income group,
which was the larger group, was significantly less affected by the reform than the higher
income group. Yet, personal income tax revenues fell for all groups except the low
income group, which was the least affected.275 Therefore, neither the country level nor
aggregate level evidence indicates that the flat tax is significantly and positively
correlated with economic growth.

Effects on Labor Supply
The overall effect on labor currently seems to be inconclusive. On a theoretical
level, people will join the labor force if their after tax income compensates them for
whatever fixed cost goes in to joining the work force and is higher than the benefits
274
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275
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received by not participating in the work force.276 An increase in the tax threshold should
encourage labor force participation since people can earn more and not pay taxes.277 An
increase in the marginal tax rate could cause people to leave the labor force, as when after
tax income declines, labor becomes less attractive.278
One’s labor supply decision is based on how his average tax rate and marginal tax
rate are affected. If marginal tax rate falls, there is a substitution effect279 towards
increased labor, since the cost of leisure increases. If average tax rate rises, there will be
an income effect280 towards increased effort since, when one receives less after taxincome, the income effect will cause him to work more in order to compensate.281 These
effects differ significantly at different levels of income.282 On a theoretical level, the
effect on labor is largely uncertain.283
The empirical evidence for how a flat tax affects labor supply is limited due to
lack of available data. Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm examined the effects in Russia using
household level data. In the Russian flat tax reform, the low income group, which was the
larger group, was significantly less affected by the reform than the higher income group.
Ivanova et al. looked at the lower income group as the control group and the higher
income group as the treatment group and compare behavior between the pre and post tax
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reform periods. Their analysis suggested that there was no evidence for a labor supply
change. Ivanova et al. did not find that gross income or hours worked increased more
among the treatment group. They also found that the only group that did show a
significant increase was the control group.284

Equity
On a theoretical level, it is not clear whether a flat or progressive tax system is
more equitable in the sense of redistributing income from high to low income
individuals.285 Pre-tax income, Y, is assumed to be independent of the tax schedule,
meaning people’s salary does not depend on the tax structure in place. A tax system ‘A’
is assumed to be more progressive than a tax system ‘B’ if it has a more unequal
distribution of tax payments; it is more progressive if the low income people pay a
smaller share of all tax payments under A than B.286 This model assumes that both tax
systems raise the same revenue and focuses purely on equality.
In the case of the Baltic countries, there is a tax free level of income, which is
greater under the flat tax than the progressive tax, meaning there was an increase in the
threshold before which one was taxed under the flat tax reforms.287 In this case, the low
income individuals are paying less tax under the new flat tax structure than the preceding
progressive tax system.288 If the flat tax structure provides a higher minimum tax
threshold, there are two possible outcomes. In the first case, the flat tax rate is at least as
high as the highest pre-reform marginal tax rate. Therefore, the tax schedules cross only
284
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once (see figure 1).289 This situation is comparable to what occurred in Latvia and
Lithuania after their flat tax reforms.290 It is an unambiguously more progressive system
in the sense that on the low income side, fewer people have to pay taxes as the threshold
increases, and on the higher income side, the tax rate remains the same. Therefore, the
lower income people pay an overall lower share of total tax payments under the flat tax
system.
Figure 1
Flat
tax

Progressive
tax

Tax

The highest tax payment
under the flat tax falls
above that of the progressive
tax schedule. Therefore,
the flat tax is unambiguously
more “progressive” than the
preceding system of
differentiated tax rates.

There is a higher tax
threshold under the flat tax.
Therefore, low income people
are paying less taxes under the
flat tax system

Income

The second situation is that the flat tax lies in between the high and low ends of
the pre-reform tax levels. In this scenario the tax schedules cross twice (see figure 2).
This situation is comparable to what occurred under the Estonian reform.291 In this case it
is ambiguous which tax system is more progressive because the lower income people are

289

Ibid.
Keen, p. 724.
291
Ibid.
290

Deena Greenberg

Page 62

3/24/2009

paying fewer taxes than under the previous structure, but the higher income group also
pays a lower tax rate than it did before.292 It is unclear whether or not the low income
people pay a smaller share of the total tax payments under the new flat tax system.
Therefore, with regard to redistribution of income, on a theoretical level, the higher the
marginal tax rate of the flat tax, the less inequality there will be in after-tax income.293

Progressive
tax

Figure 2

Flat
tax

Tax
The highest tax payment
under the flat tax falls
below that of the progressive
tax schedule. Therefore,
it is ambiguous which tax system
is actually more “progressive.”

There is a higher tax
threshold under the flat tax.
Therefore, low income people
are paying less taxes under the
flat tax system

Income

The effects of flat taxes on income redistribution empirically have also been
inconclusive. In “Main Drivers of Income Inequality in Central European and Baltic
Countries – Some Insights from Recent Household Survey Data,” Salman Zaidi examines
indicators and causes of inequality in the EU8 countries, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia,
292
293
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Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.294 He uses data from the
2006 European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions and data from the EU
SILC study to examine the Gini coefficients295 of the EU8. The Gini coefficients are used
as a metric to measure income inequality in the different countries.

Table 8. Gini coefficient for income per capita
Country

1987-90

1993-94

1996-99

2006

Czech Republic
Estonia

0.19
0.24

0.23
0.35

0.25
0.37

0.27
0.35

Hungary
Latvia
Lithunia

0.21
0.24
0.23

0.23
0.31
0.33

0.25
0.32
0.34

0.34
0.40
0.37

Poland

0.28

0.28

0.33

0.33

Slovakia

-

-

-

0.30

Slovenia

0.22

0.29

0.25

0.26

Source: Salman Zaidi, p. 7, 2006 World Bank staff calculations based on data from 2006 EU-SILC

The Baltic states, which adopted the flat tax between 1994 and 1995, show the
greatest income inequality overall and the Gini coefficient in fact increases since the
adoption of the flat tax.296 While this alone does not conclude that flat taxes are less
equitable, it certainly does not make the case that a flat tax helps alleviate income
inequality. In looking at Zaidi’s analysis, however, one must also realize that it is difficult
to look at long term Gini coefficient trends for countries, since countries often change the
household surveys used to aggregate information. Gini coefficients are highly sensitive to
such changes, and thus, long term comparisons should be seen only as broader estimates.

294
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295
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Therefore, while it is likely that inequality has risen in the Baltic states since the adoption
of the flat tax, it is questionable whether this rise is as large as what the numbers suggest.
Zaidi also looks at the difference between pre tax and post tax Gini coefficients to
examine how much the tax is able to redistribute income.297

Table 9. Gini Coefficient of Income Inequality
Pre-tax-benefit
incomes

Post tax
incomes

Difference in pre/
post tax Ginis

Ratio of pre/
post tax Ginis

Czech Republic

0.485

0.340

0.145

1.426

Slovakia

0.474

0.339

0.135

1.398

Hungary

0.568

0.429

0.139

1.324

Lithuania

0.540

0.413

0.127

1.308

Slovenia

0.471

0.369

0.102

1.276

Estonia

0.499

0.391

0.108

1.276

Poland

0.558

0.440

0.118

1.268

Country

Source: Salman Zaidi, p. 13, 2006 World Bank staff calculations based on data from 2006 EU-SILC

Looking at the ratio between pre and post tax reforms, Estonia and Lithuania had
ratios of 1.28 and 1.31, which suggests that the flat tax has some redistributive effect on
overall income distribution. The higher the ratio is, the more redistribution is taking
place. This redistributive effect in the Baltic countries is comparable (in the middle for
Lithuania and on the lower end for Estonia) with the redistributive effect of the tax
schemes of the other EU8 countries. Thus, no definitive statement can be made as to the
exact redistributive effect of the flat tax, although it appears as though the flat tax has a
comparable redistribution to progressive tax countries. There is also no evidence from
this analysis that flat tax countries have significantly higher inequality overall than

297

Latvia is excluded from this analysis because the EU-SILC dataset does not provide data on gross
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progressive tax countries, an argument frequently used by opponents of the flat tax. This
is the case when the Baltic countries are compared to both the EU8 countries and EU15.
Chart 8. Gini Coefficients in European Countries
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Source: Salman Zaidi, p. 9, 2006 World Bank staff calculations
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Studies have been conducted examining the income distribution effects of a flat
tax in the Slovak Republic. The Slovak Republic implemented a tax reform in 2004,
which included a 19 percent flat personal income tax, replacing a 10-38 percent rate
schedule. The reform also included an increase in deductions and tax credits. A World
Bank report examining the distributional impacts of these reforms found that the majority
of household saw increased disposable incomes. The households that saw disposable
income decline were those with more than two children where all adults were
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unemployed, and therefore saw more benefits before the reform.298 The study also found
that overall poverty decreased, suggesting that the personal income tax reform did have a
positive effect on alleviating inequity.299 While this case study, like the discussion on the
Gini coefficients above, does not indicate a strong redistributive effect of the flat tax, it
does serve as one counterargument to the claim that the flat tax increases inequality.

Simplicity and Compliance
The flat tax, marketed as the “postcard” reform, purports to make tax payments
significantly simpler. This simplicity may in fact be the strongest reason for a transitional
economy to adopt a flat tax. While the claims of increased growth and equity are not yet
substantiated in theory or practice, the flat tax does create a simpler system. Tax returns
can be filed in less than fifteen minutes300 and most deductions and exemptions have been
removed. The system, overall, is simple. Jonas Cicinskas said that the conversations
today in Lithuania pay attention not to any complexity of the tax system but to whether or
not the system can be made more elaborate. Therefore, while it is not clear whether or not
a flat tax leads to revenue growth or is more equitable, it does create a simpler system.301
While simplicity alone may not lead to increased growth, without a simple tax
structure, transitional economies will likely face increased difficulties in revenue
collection. Karsten Staehr explained that there is some anecdotal evidence from Ukraine
and Russia that the complexities of tax systems were so extreme that people decided it
was not worth doing anything. In the mid 1990s, during the Yeltsin era, Russians had so

298
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much trouble getting tax revenues paid that tax police went out and raided companies,
even bakeries. Ukraine, as well, faced challenges during the beginning of its transition.
Looking at income tax revenue, Ukraine and Russia did not grow as much in the early
1990s. While the flat tax was likely not the only reason for the Baltic states’ success, it
did not prevent this success from occurring. As Staher explained, “Estonia got a tax
system that was fairly transparent and easy to handle so it didn’t stand in the way for the
economy turning around.”302
Furthermore, simplicity should lead to increased payments due to increased
compliance, as a simpler tax system makes it easier for citizens to pay taxes. In general,
the effects of compliance are difficult to measure, as by nature, non-compliance is
difficult to quantify.303 On a theoretical level, the impact of rates on compliance can
depend on the type of costs the taxpayer would incur in avoiding payment weighed
against the money saved from avoiding tax payments.304 Looking at the effect of the flat
tax across countries that use it, compliance seemed to increase when both the personal
income tax and corporate income tax were enacted at the same rate.305 States with less
burdensome tax regimes also showed increased compliance.306
An analysis of the Russian reform, performed by Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm does
suggest that compliance improved since flat tax implementation. They compared
consumption with income reported, assuming people would be more truthful about
consumption. Looking at ratio of reported income to actual income, Ivanova et al.
observed that for those affected by the reform, the ratio increased from 52 to 70
302

Staehr, Karsten, phone interview, February 10, 2009.
Keen, p 735.
304
Ibid, p. 734.
305
Saavedra, p. 277.
306
Ibid.
303
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percent.307 However, the researchers concluded that the increased compliance could not
necessarily be attributed to the flat tax, since there were also tax administration
improvements implemented simultaneously.308

307
308

Keen, p. 735.
Saavedra, p. 261.
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Conclusions
In general, the effects of a flat tax are difficult to isolate both on the country and
aggregate level. In each country, the flat tax was generally accompanied by monetary,
fiscal, and political reforms. With the exception of Ukraine, the flat tax reforms always
followed a change in government.309 Additionally, with the exception of Latvia, the tax
reform included an increase in personal allowances.310 Looking at both the theory and
data, there is no clear evidence that the flat tax alone improves revenues, labor output,
growth, or equity. In fact, with regard to redistribution, there is a case to be made that the
flat tax redistributes income less than a progressive tax system. Furthermore, the case of
Latvia suggested that the flat tax may actually increase involvement in the underground
economy.
Thus, the main argument for the adoption of a flat tax in transitional economies is
based on its simplicity. Transitional economies, with a newly formed government and
limited state apparatus, are not as well positioned as their developed counterparts to
implement a complex tax structure with differentiated levels of taxation. Therefore, the
main advantage of a flat tax is that it sets in place a system where people can easily pay
taxes and the government can easily administer taxes.
Looking at a flat tax in this vein, timing is essential to the reform. As Mart Laar
noted, a reform launched as quickly as possible had a better chance of success than
several prolonged measures.311 Drawing on Balcerowicz’s theory, that domestic
liberalization and freedom from foreign domination create a mass psychology in which
the people want, more than in a normal situation, to look towards the future and the
309

Keen, p. 739.
Ibid, p. 718.
311
Laar , “The Estonian Economic Miracle,” p. 2.
310
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greater good, Laar noted that radical reforms had to be passed in order to ensure their
success.312 Thus, perhaps the early implementation of the reforms more than the flat tax
by itself is what allowed Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to become Baltic Tigers, while
countries who had later implementation did not necessarily greet the same success.
Furthermore, these tax policies cannot exist in isolation. In every successful case of a flat
tax, monetary, governmental, and parallel fiscal reforms accompanied.
Thus, the question of whether or not to implement a flat tax in transitional
economies cannot be looked at in a vacuum. There is no evidence that the flat tax by
itself causes increased growth, equity, or compliance on its own. In fact, the analysis on
the Baltic countries suggests that the flat tax may cause less income redistribution than
progressive tax countries, and in the case of Latvia compliance may decrease under the
flat tax. Therefore, while there is no definitive evidence that the flat tax creates growth,
the simplicity of the flat tax appears to at least allow growth to take place during the early
years of transition. However, past this period of initial development, there is no
conclusive evidence that the flat tax is an appropriate model for continued growth.

312

Laar, “The Estonian Economic Miracle,” pp. 2-3.
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Appendix 1: Flat Taxes Across the World

Flat Taxes Across the World
Flat tax jurisdiction

Year enacted

Tax rate

Jersey

1940

20%

Hong Kong

1947

16%

Guernsey

1960

20%

Estonia

(a)

1994

22%

Latvia

1995

25%

Lithuania

1996

27%

Russia

2001

13%

Serbia

2003

14%

Slovakia

2004

19%

2004

15%

Romania

2005

16%

Georgia

2005

12%

Iceland

2007

36%

Mongolia

2007

10%

Kyrgyzstan

2007

10%

Macedonia

2007

12%

Montenengro

2007

15%

Czech Republic

2008

15%

Albania

2008

10%

(b)

Ukraine

(c)

(a) originally 26%
(b) originally 33%
(c) originally 13%
Source:
Daniel Mitchell. "Flat World, Flat Taxes." Cato at Liberty, April 27, 2007
Alvin Rabushka. "The Flat Tax Spreads to the Czech Republic." hoover.org, 27 August 2008
Daniel Mitchell. "Albania Joins the Flat Tax Club." Cato at Liberty, April 9, 2007
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Appendix 2: The Analysis of Labor Force Participation in Latvia
Using data from the World Bank’s Household Expenditure and Income Data for
Transitional Economies (HEIDE), the effect of the flat tax on labor force participation in
Latvia was estimated. The dataset contains household and individual level data for people
in Latvia from 1997 to 1998 and was analyzed data for the male household heads. The
information used in the analysis included gender, age, education, labor force participation
(employed, unemployed, or inactive), wages, non-labor income, and number of children
(under the age of 14).313
The idea behind the analysis is that each individual tries to maximize a utility
function, which is composed of consumption and leisure.

uc, P,  = c + α 1 + 1 − P + α2 c1 − P
with c representing consumption and P representing employment, or labor force
participation. P = 1 if someone is employed and 0 if someone is unemployed (those who
are inactive are discarding from the analysis). Epsilon (ε) is a shock that causes someone
to decide whether or not to work, it can be though of as disutility from labor, and α1 α2
are parameters.
Consumption is attained by taxable labor income (w) and non-labor income (y). The tax
rate on wages, is represented by τ. This is represented by the function:

c = y + P1 − τw
Substituting consumption (c) into the original utility function, the utility for someone
unemployed is (P=0) represented by

uc, 0,  = α 1 + 1 − P + 1 + α 2 y
and the utility for someone employed (P =1 ) is represented by

uc, 1,  = y + P1 − τw
If someone is employed, their utility from employment is greater than their utility from
being employed is greater than being unemployed

uc, 1,  ≥ uc, 0, 
and

y + P1 − τw ≥ α 1 + 1 − P + 1 + α 2 y
313

This analysis was completed with the assistance of Flavio Cunha, Assistant Professor of Economics,
University of Pennsylvania.
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Solving this inequality for ε

≤ 1 − τw − α 2 y − α 1
equation -1This is the level of shock for anyone who decides to work. Therefore, anyone with a
shock above this level will decide not to work. These equations can help understand the
decision of whether or not to work and how tax rate affects it. However, those who are
unemployed do not have information on wages, since they are not working. Therefore,
wages are estimated using the equation

w = xβ + η equation -2x is a variable that contains the variables age and education as well as a constant, and η is
a shock that would cause someone’s wage to change.
However, the problem with this estimation is that wages are only for those employed,
creating a selection problem. The people who are already in the workforce have certain
characteristics and made certain decisions that enabled them to work and these will be
reflected in the wages they receive. Therefore, the labor force participation should be
taken into account as a factor in the wages instead of assuming that unemployed people
would receive comparable wages to those employed. Therefore, in order to estimate, β
for the wage in such a way, a Heckman selection model is used.314

314

The Heckman selection model used to account for selection bias. This occurs when the independent
variables depend on unmeasured variables, which also impact the independent variable. Here, the wages in
the model are just for those who are working, which presents a bias in the wage data. Therefore, the
regresion first models whether or not one is employed. Then, using this information, it models what the
wage would be based on different factors.
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Heckman Selection Model: The Effect of Age and Education on Wage
Coef.
wagey

select

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

95% Conf. Interval

AGE

3.899

2.727

1.43

0.153

-1.447

9.244

AGE2

-0.031

0.032

-0.99

0.325

-0.093

0.031

educat

54.130

4.138

13.08

0.000

46.020

62.240

_cons

-86.847

61.436

-1.41

0.157

-207.260

33.566

AGE

0.165

0.018

9.07

0.000

0.129

0.200

AGE2

-0.002

0.000

-12.04

0.000

-0.003

-0.002

educat

0.268

0.028

9.48

0.000

0.213

0.324

-0.002

0.000

-5.82

0.000

-0.003

-0.001

0.068

0.034

1.97

0.049

0.000

0.135

_cons

-2.547

0.445

-5.73

0.000

-3.419

-1.676

/athrho

-0.155

0.081

-1.90

0.057

-0.314

0.005

/lnsigma

4.970

0.017

293.15

0.000

4.936

5.003

NONLABORY
CHILDN

rho

-0.153

0.079

-0.30

0.005

sigma

143.971

2.441

139.27

148.835

lambda

-22.086

11.558

-44.74

0.568

Source: HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98

After using the Heckman model to find the wage for unemployed people, a probit315
regression is used to predict the effect of wage on labor force participation. First,
equation -2- is placed into equation -1- (in place of w in equation 1),

 − 1 − τη≤ 1 − τxβ − α 2 y − α 1
and

 − 1 − τη≤ 1 − τxβ − α 2 γ − α 1
letting

 − 1 − τη = υ
then
315

A probit regression is a nonlinear regression model designed for binary dependent variables. (Stock and
Watson, 389) In this case, the dependent variable was binary with the outcomes unemployment = 0 and
unemployment = 1. Each coefficient given by the probit regression gives the expected change in the
probability that Y (labor force status) = 1. (Stock and Watson, 391)
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υ≤ 1 − τxβ − α 2 y − α 1
equation -3If ε and η are normally distributed,316 represented by



0

~N

η

0

,

σ 2

σ η

σ η

σ 2η

Then

υ =  − 1 − τη~N0, σ 2 − 2σ η 1 − τ + 1 − τ 2 σ 2η 
In this equation, we are defining, the variance of ν to be

σ 2υ = σ 2 − 2σ η 1 − τ + 1 − τ 2 σ 2η
Therefore,
υ
σ υ ~N0, 1 is normally distributed
Going back to equation 3, we can divide both sides by

υ
συ

≤

συ

1−τxβ−α 2 y−α 1
συ
equation -4-

Therefore, the probability that someone works is found by finding the normal distribution
in equation 4.317

1−τxβ−α 2 γ−α 1
υ
≤
συ
συ
1−τxβ−α 2 γ−α 1
συ

PrP = 1 = Pr
=Φ

υ
συ

≤

1−τxβ−α 2 γ−α 1
συ
is, the variables in the equation need
However, in order to find what
to be found. We know τ, the tax rate is 25% is Latvia. Therefore, the variables
316

Something normally distributed means that it has a bell shaped distribution. Something that has a
standard normal distribution has a normal distribution with a mean 0, and a variance of 1, denoted N(0,1)
317
Random variables with the N(0,1) distribution, denoted by Z, have a cumulative distribution function
denoted by Φ. Therefore, the probability that Z<c = Φ(c) (Stock and Watson, 39).
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α1
σ υ can be estimated using a probit regression. This will give the effect of
wage on labor participation.

,

,

Probit Regression: The Effect of Wage, Education, and Children on Labor Force
Participation
lfs

Coef.

Std. Err.

z

P>|z|

95% Conf. Interval

WAGEITAX

-0.001

0.000

-3.71

0.000

-0.002

-0.001

educat

0.464

0.026

17.52

0.000

0.412

0.516

CHILDN

0.425

0.029

14.65

0.000

0.368

0.482

-1.049

0.066

-15.9

0.000

-1.178

-0.920

_cons

Source: HEIDE Database, The World Bank, 1997-98

___ ____ ____ ____ ____ tm
/__ / ____/ / ____/
___/ / /___/ / /___/ 10.1 Copyright 1984-2008
Statistics/Data Analysis
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)
34-student Stata for Windows (network) perpetual license:
Serial number: 1910516915
Licensed to: Chris Sabella
Univ of Penn
Notes:
1. (/m# option or -set memory-) 4.88 MB allocated to data
. use C:\Users\krb-user16\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp1_LATHH.ZIP\LATHH.DTA

. drop if gender == 2
(4410 observations deleted)
. drop if AGE < 25
(86 observations deleted)
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. replace lfs = 0 if lfs == 3
(1093 real changes made)
. replace lfs = 0 if lfs == 2
(185 real changes made)
. gen PITAXAGE = (1-.25)*AGE
. gen PITAXAGE2 = (1-.25)*AGE2
. gen NONLABORY = familyy + totpeny + socassy + unempy + othsocy + pritry +
othery
. replace wagey = . if lfs == 0
(1278 real changes made, 1278 to missing)
. heckman wagey AGE AGE2 educa, select(AGE AGE2 educa NONLABORY
CHILDN)
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2:
Iteration 3:

log likelihood = -13531.895
log likelihood = -13527.583
log likelihood = -13527.401
log likelihood = -13527.4

Heckman selection model
Number of obs
=
3194
(regression model with sample selection)
Censored obs
=
1278
Uncensored obs =
1916

Log likelihood = -13527.4

Wald chi2(3)
= 188.43
Prob > chi2
= 0.0000

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------| Coef. Std. Err.
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------wagey
|
AGE | 3.898506 2.727143 1.43 0.153 -1.446596 9.243608
AGE2 | -.0312363 .0317081 -0.99 0.325 -.0933831 .0309106
educat | 54.12978 4.137876 13.08 0.000 46.01969 62.23987
_cons | -86.8468 61.4364 -1.41 0.157 -207.2599 33.56634
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------select
|
AGE | .1646233 .0181477 9.07 0.000 .1290544 .2001922
AGE2 | -.0022389 .0001859 -12.04 0.000 -.0026033 -.0018745
educat | .2682636 .0282978 9.48 0.000
.212801 .3237263
NONLABORY | -.0020653 .0003548 -5.82 0.000 -.0027608 -.0013699
CHILDN | .0675066 .0342675 1.97 0.049 .0003436 .1346696
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_cons | -2.547142 .4447073 -5.73 0.000 -3.418752 -1.675531
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------/athrho | -.1546265 .0813673 -1.90 0.057 -.3141035 .0048504
/lnsigma | 4.969613 .0169522 293.15 0.000 4.936387 5.002838
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------rho | -.1534059 .0794524
-.3041656 .0048504
sigma | 143.9711 2.440623
139.2662 148.835
lambda | -22.08601 11.55836
-44.73999 .5679624
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0): chi2(1) = 2.19 Prob > chi2 = 0.1393
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------. gen wagecarrot = (3.898506*AGE)+(-.0312363*AGE2)+(54.12978*educa) - 86.8468 if
l
> fs == 0
(1916 missing values generated)
. gen WAGEI = .
(3194 missing values generated)
. replace WAGEI = wagey if lfs == 1
(1916 real changes made)
. replace WAGEI = wagecarrot if lfs == 0
(1278 real changes made)
. gen WAGEITAX = (1-.25)*WAGEI
. prob lfs PITAXAGE PITAXAGE2 WAGEITAX educa CHILDN
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2:
Iteration 3:
Iteration 4:
Iteration 5:

log likelihood = -2149.7613
log likelihood = -1410.7917
log likelihood = -1320.6277
log likelihood = -1309.001
log likelihood = -1308.7778
log likelihood = -1308.7777

Probit regression

Number of obs =
3194
LR chi2(5)
= 1681.97
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1308.7777
Pseudo R2
= 0.3912
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------lfs | Coef. Std. Err.
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------PITAXAGE | .2404037 .0242867 9.90 0.000 .1928026

.2880047
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PITAXAGE2 | -.0032573 .0002477 -13.15 0.000 -.0037429 -.0027717
WAGEITAX | -.0008492 .0003251 -2.61 0.009 -.0014864 -.0002119
educat | .2913997 .0312334 9.33 0.000 .2301834 .352616
CHILDN | .0498893 .0340255 1.47 0.143 -.0167994 .116578
_cons | -2.853505 .4460625 -6.40 0.000 -3.727771 -1.979238
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: 10 failures and 0 successes completely determined.
. prob lfs WAGEITAX educa CHILDN
Iteration 0:
Iteration 1:
Iteration 2:
Iteration 3:

log likelihood = -2149.7613
log likelihood = -1816.6116
log likelihood = -1809.9957
log likelihood = -1809.9818

Probit regression

Number of obs =
3194
LR chi2(3)
= 679.56
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log likelihood = -1809.9818
Pseudo R2
= 0.1581
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------lfs | Coef. Std. Err.
z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------WAGEITAX | -.0010865 .0002929 -3.71 0.000 -.0016607 -.0005124
educat | .4641372 .0264911 17.52 0.000 .4122157 .5160587
CHILDN | .4253114 .0290355 14.65 0.000 .3684028
.48222
_cons | -1.049016 .0659652 -15.90 0.000 -1.178306 -.9197267
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix 3: Fixed Effect Regression: The Effect of the Flat Tax on Macroeconomic
Variables
Independent Variable: The Flat Tax
Dependent Variables: Constant GDP, the Natural Log of Constant GDP, GDP Growth,
Average Consumer Prices, and Percent change of Consumer prices

___ ____ ____ ____ ____ tm
/__ / ____/ / ____/
___/ / /___/ / /___/ 10.0 Copyright 1984-2007
Statistics/Data Analysis
StataCorp
4905 Lakeway Drive
College Station, Texas 77845 USA
800-STATA-PC
http://www.stata.com
979-696-4600
stata@stata.com
979-696-4601 (fax)
24-student Stata for Windows (network) perpetual license:
Serial number: 1910517433
Licensed to: UPenn Library
UPenn Library
Notes:
1. (/m# option or -set memory-) 1.00 MB allocated to data
. (11 vars, 153 obs pasted into editor)
gen y91=(year==1991)
. gen y92=(year==1992)
. gen y93=(year==1993)
. gen y94=(year==1994)
. gen y95=(year==1995)
. gen y96=(year==1996)
. gen y97=(year==1997)
. gen y98=(year==1998)
. gen y99=(year==1999)
. gen y00=(year==2000)
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. gen y01=(year==2001)
. gen y02=(year==2002)
. gen y03=(year==2003)
. gen y04=(year==2004)
. gen y05=(year==2005)
. gen y06=(year==2006)
. gen y07=(year==2007)
. areg gdpconstant d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y0
> 5 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust
Linear regression, absorbing indicators
Number of obs =
F( 17, 109) = 1.00
Prob > F = 0.4618
R-squared = 0.9678
Adj R-squared = 0.9604
Root MSE
= 1336.1

135

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
gdpconstant | Coef. Std. Err.
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------d | 987.8814 352.9682 2.80 0.006
288.31 1687.453
y91 | -738.2672 473.5873 -1.56 0.122 -1676.902 200.3675
y92 | (dropped)
y93 | -446.8312 397.5854 -1.12 0.264 -1234.833 341.1702
y94 | -1072.965 542.0343 -1.98 0.050 -2147.259 1.329748
y95 | -1287.252 611.4006 -2.11 0.038 -2499.028 -75.47554
y96 | -1361.374 679.2993 -2.00 0.048 -2707.723 -15.02473
y97 | -1327.847 653.6942 -2.03 0.045 -2623.447 -32.24601
y98 | -1331.396 715.6017 -1.86 0.066 -2749.696 86.90308
y99 | -1229.528 610.7527 -2.01 0.047 -2440.02 -19.03656
y00 | -1032.862 477.211 -2.16 0.033 -1978.678 -87.04511
y01 | -1023.531 472.5538 -2.17 0.032 -1960.117 -86.94453
y02 | -908.8833 452.294 -2.01 0.047 -1805.315 -12.45128
y03 | -838.4506 472.3306 -1.78 0.079 -1774.595 97.69334
y04 | -859.4514 575.9256 -1.49 0.139 -2000.917 282.0145
y05 | -892.4767 765.9421 -1.17 0.246 -2410.549 625.5956
y06 | -661.332 924.782 -0.72 0.476 -2494.22 1171.556
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y07 | -388.0627 1137.767 -0.34 0.734 -2643.081 1866.955
_cons | 3149.629 381.027 8.27 0.000 2394.446 3904.813
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------country | absorbed
(9 categories)
. areg lngdpconstant d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04
> y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust
Linear regression, absorbing indicators
Number of obs =
F( 17, 109) = 47.73
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.9985
Adj R-squared = 0.9982
Root MSE
= .10722

135

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
lngdpconst~t | Coef. Std. Err.
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------d | -.0300845 .0332009 -0.91 0.367 -.0958875 .0357185
y91 | -.0905873 .1178873 -0.77 0.444 -.3242361 .1430614
y92 | (dropped)
y93 | -.1817699 .1467523 -1.24 0.218 -.4726281 .1090883
y94 | -.2493644 .1282827 -1.94 0.054 -.5036165 .0048877
y95 | -.243105 .1256889 -1.93 0.056 -.4922162 .0060062
y96 | -.219146 .1236687 -1.77 0.079 -.4642533 .0259614
y97 | -.177759 .1210539 -1.47 0.145 -.4176839 .0621659
y98 | -.1454835 .1231075 -1.18 0.240 -.3894786 .0985116
y99 | -.1469642 .1211389 -1.21 0.228 -.3870577 .0931292
y00 | -.0971353 .1205261 -0.81 0.422 -.3360141 .1417436
y01 | -.033733 .1215514 -0.28 0.782 -.2746438 .2071778
y02 | .0203457 .1218449 0.17 0.868 -.2211469 .2618384
y03 | .0935733 .1234979 0.76 0.450 -.1511955 .3383421
y04 | .1755822 .1258539 1.40 0.166 -.0738562 .4250206
y05 | .2497877 .1303868 1.92 0.058 -.0086348 .5082101
y06 | .3312048 .1316378 2.52 0.013
.070303 .5921066
y07 | .4132897 .1320782 3.13 0.002
.151515 .6750643
_cons | 5.099774 .1150799 44.32 0.000 4.871689 5.327859
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------country | absorbed
(9 categories)
. areg growthrate d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02 y03 y04 y05
> y06 y07, absorb (country) robust
Linear regression, absorbing indicators
Number of obs =
F( 16, 101) =
.

127
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Prob > F =
R-squared = 0.6290
Adj R-squared = 0.5372
Root MSE
= .04417
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
growthrate | Coef. Std. Err.
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------d | .0197955 .0135011 1.47 0.146 -.0069869 .046578
y91 | (dropped)
y92 | -.1518617
.
.
.
.
.
y93 | -.1518149 .0382629 -3.97 0.000 -.2277182 -.0759116
y94 | -.1144721 .0414078 -2.76 0.007 -.1966141 -.0323301
y95 | -.0605896 .024461 -2.48 0.015 -.1091137 -.0120655
y96 | -.0391294 .02087 -1.87 0.064
-.08053 .0022712
y97 | -.0217017 .025896 -0.84 0.404 -.0730725 .0296691
y98 | -.0482351 .0207862 -2.32 0.022 -.0894692 -.007001
y99 | -.0608397 .0199847 -3.04 0.003 -.100484 -.0211954
y00 | -.00953 .019555 -0.49 0.627 -.0483219 .0292618
y01 | -.001499 .0172246 -0.09 0.931 -.035668
.03267
y02 | -.0074798 .0148185 -0.50 0.615 -.0368757 .0219162
y03 | .0061269 .0175393 0.35 0.728 -.0286664 .0409202
y04 | .0071663 .0164627 0.44 0.664 -.0254912 .0398238
y05 | -.0050359 .0163569 -0.31 0.759 -.0374836 .0274118
y06 | .008861 .0155071 0.57 0.569 -.0219009 .0396229
y07 | .0095289 .0166819 0.57 0.569 -.0235635 .0426212
_cons | .0533355 .0150955 3.53 0.001 .0233902 .0832809
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------country | absorbed
(9 categories)
. areg inflationaverageindex d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02
> y03 y04 y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust
Linear regression, absorbing indicators
Number of obs =
F( 17, 110) = 21.33
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.7750
Adj R-squared = 0.7238
Root MSE
= 37.64

136

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
inflationa~x | Coef. Std. Err.
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------d | 47.5685 11.60544 4.10 0.000 24.56923 70.56776
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y91 | -34.22176 16.55273 -2.07 0.041 -67.02539 -1.418133
y92 | (dropped)
y93 | 19.39849 18.58037 1.04 0.299 -17.42344 56.22042
y94 | 14.42051 17.53338 0.82 0.413 -20.32654 49.16755
y95 | 23.89607 16.16433 1.48 0.142 -8.137839 55.92998
y96 | 36.80545 16.9429 2.17 0.032 3.228598 70.38229
y97 | 31.98886 20.35601 1.57 0.119 -8.351972 72.3297
y98 | 39.43308 19.6419 2.01 0.047 .5074386 78.35873
y99 | 52.98786 18.82546 2.81 0.006 15.68023 90.2955
y00 | 67.8732 16.62035 4.08 0.000 34.93556 100.8108
y01 | 82.7357 14.83566 5.58 0.000 53.33489 112.1365
y02 | 94.22681 16.08627 5.86 0.000
62.3476 126.106
y03 | 99.5122 17.60557 5.65 0.000
64.6221 134.4023
y04 | 100.4205 21.73536 4.62 0.000 57.34615 143.4949
y05 | 105.0319 21.14874 4.97 0.000 63.12002 146.9437
y06 | 118.898 23.16041 5.13 0.000 72.99948 164.7965
y07 | 132.3608 24.40622 5.42 0.000 83.99334 180.7282
_cons | 13.45215 12.47747 1.08 0.283 -11.27527 38.17957
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------country | absorbed
(9 categories)
. areg inflationaveragechange d y91 y92 y93 y94 y95 y96 y97 y98 y99 y00 y01 y02
> y03 y04 y05 y06 y07, absorb (country) robust
Linear regression, absorbing indicators
Number of obs =
F( 16, 102) =
.
Prob > F =
R-squared = 0.4010
Adj R-squared = 0.2542
Root MSE
= 371.98

128

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
inflationa~e | Coef. Std. Err.
t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------d | 119.8364 137.9799 0.87 0.387 -153.8461 393.5188
y91 | (dropped)
y92 | 49.265
.
.
.
.
.
y93 | 1087.898 798.6037 1.36 0.176 -496.1283 2671.925
y94 | 3.960492 108.7713 0.04 0.971 -211.7869 219.7079
y95 | -118.61 86.94411 -1.36 0.176 -291.0632 53.84321
y96 | -192.9846 91.22635 -2.12 0.037 -373.9317 -12.0376
y97 | -199.1093 100.1973 -1.99 0.050 -397.8501 -.3684249
y98 | -209.4179 92.30642 -2.27 0.025 -392.5072 -26.32855
y99 | -200.9527 91.87995 -2.19 0.031 -383.1961 -18.70924
y00 | -205.7827 91.16781 -2.26 0.026 -386.6136 -24.95175
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y01 | -219.9058 96.53944 -2.28 0.025 -411.3913 -28.4203
y02 | -231.8868 96.18664 -2.41 0.018 -422.6726 -41.10108
y03 | -246.4525 103.2111 -2.39 0.019 -451.1713 -41.73372
y04 | -272.7276 121.3908 -2.25 0.027 -513.5057 -31.94949
y05 | -298.0695 142.9483 -2.09 0.040 -581.6068 -14.5321
y06 | -299.2742 143.096 -2.09 0.039 -583.1045 -15.44402
y07 | -299.1732 143.1783 -2.09 0.039 -583.1668 -15.17973
_cons | 185.1668 84.90502 2.18 0.031 16.75812 353.5755
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------country | absorbed
(9 categories)

3/24/2009
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